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This thesis describes the benefits of maintaining United States Naval Forward 
Presence in the Mediterranean.  It encompasses several themes to justify its point of view.  
It argues that the Mediterranean has been important to the United States for over 200 
years.  It describes the significant United States political and economic interests in the 
region.  As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strongest member, the 
United States has a vested interest to ensure that the Mediterranean remains open and 
accessible. 
Geographically the “Middle Sea” is an essential link between the Atlantic, the 
Persian Gulf and beyond.  It forms a bridge across which three continents interact.  But 
the Mediterranean’s geographic configuration and complex political environment also 
makes it an operational challenge.  Finally, the complexities and acrimony of 
Mediterranean politics calls for the United States Navy to support a variety of missions 
from “stability and support” to “small-scale contingencies” (SSCs) or potentially more 
conventional operations.  However, the political, economic and geographic characteristics 
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The United States has found it necessary to intervene in the Mediterranean to 
protect its own interests and the safety of United States citizens living there.  From the 
late 18th Century, United States naval vessels began making frequent voyages to the 
Mediterranean Sea to protect American merchantmen under attack by Barbary pirates 
operating out of Tangier, Algiers, Tunisia and Tripoli.  These states demanded tribute in 
return for safe passage through the Mediterranean Sea.  However, by 1815 the United 
States had signed agreements with the Dey of Algiers and turned over the task of policing 
the Mediterranean to Great Britain’s Royal Navy. 
 Mediterranean instability during the first half of the 20th Century saw a 
resurgence of United States Naval Forward Presence there.  The kidnapping of influential 
Americans by the Moroccan bandit El Raisuni caused President Theodore Roosevelt to 
dispatch United States naval ships to Tangier at the turn of the century.  However, the 
real resurgence of the United States Navy into the Mediterranean occurred during World 
War II, when the Mediterranean became important to the defeat of the Axis.  The second 
half of the 20th Century marked the beginning of the Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union.  The focus of international attention on the Mediterranean forced 
the United States to accept its new leadership role in the Mediterranean after Great 
Britain acknowledged that it could no longer meet its commitments there.  From this 
moment, the United States Navy and United States Marine Corps have intervened on 
numerous occasions in the Middle East, Libya and in Bosnia/Kosovo. 
 x 
The Mediterranean’s economic significance revolves around its value as a critical 
transportation route linking European trade to North Africa, the Middle East, the Black 
Sea and beyond.  The Strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish Straits of the Aegean-Dardanelles-
Bosporous and the Suez Canal connect the Mediterranean to vitally important areas of 
interest to the United States, NATO and its European Allies.  Maintaining safe and 
unhindered access to the Mediterranean Sea via these strategically important entry/exit 
points allows global trade to flourish. 
 The geographical complexity of the sea itself is matched by the diversity of the 
landmasses it links.  The desert regions of Africa are intermingled with mountains that 
ring the southern Mediterranean coastline.  Europe’s southern coastline is mountainous 
and indented.  This means that sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) are more favorable 
than overland transportation routes that connect the eastern and western Mediterranean 
Regions as well as those that connect Europe to the Persian Gulf.  In addition, Western 
Europe’s land route to Iran and Iraq passes through the politically volatile and 
mountainous terrain located in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.  
Likewise, the Maghreb countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia must transit across the 
politically unpredictable land of Libya to reach Egypt and the Middle East.  Therefore, 
safety and freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean Sea is of vital importance to 
continued trade and economic prosperity of all countries in the Mediterranean Region, 
and beyond. 
Because one is never far from land in the Mediterranean, operating there is 
inherently risky for naval forces.  Terrorist attacks are more likely when the target is 
operating in littoral waters near the terrorist’s base of operations.  Weapons development 
 xi 
technology allows wealthy nations as well as poorer ones and terrorists to possess 
missiles loaded with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Even relatively low-level 
technological weapons like the explosive boat used against the USS Cole pose threats to 
the United States ships forward deployed to the greater Mediterranean region.  
Additionally, the risk of incidents and mistakes by United States forward deployed forces 
is increased when operating within a heavily trafficked and politically volatile littoral 
environment. 
The importance of maintaining United States Naval Forward Presence in the 
Mediterranean should not be underestimated.  Political and economic upheaval in the 
Mediterranean Region requires continued engagement by United States naval forces to 
deter rogue nations from exercising terrorist agendas.  United States naval forces 
currently possess the ability successfully to operate within the littoral reaches of the 
Mediterranean, but they must maintain their technological edge safely to continue the 
mission.  New ships such as the DD-21, loaded with new and improved offensive and 
defensive gun and missile systems are a step in the right direction.  Connecting DD-21’s 
to the Aegis equipped cruisers and destroyers, as well as the E-2C Hawkeye, via 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) will enhance this capability and expand the 
defensive umbrella necessary to defend against high-speed cruise missile and ballistic 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
This thesis describes the benefits of maintaining United States Naval Forward 
Presence in the Mediterranean.  It will encompass several themes to justify its point of 
view.  First, it will argue that the Mediterranean has been important to the United States 
since President Thomas Jefferson in 1801 first sent the U.S. Navy to clean out nests of 
North African pirates and so allow U.S. merchant ships unimpeded freedom to trade.  
Next, it will assert the perhaps obvious, but sometimes-overlooked, point that the United 
States continues to have significant political and economic interests in the region.  United 
States Naval Forward Presence signals to our Mediterranean and NATO allies their 
strategic importance to the United States.  It also acts as a deterrent to regional instability.  
As the strongest NATO member, the United States has a vested interest to ensure that 
Europe’s southern flank maintains its political stability and economic viability.  
Maintaining regional stability is the main reason for the United States Navy and United 
States Marine Corps to remain engaged with our NATO partners in policing the region.  
In this way, the Mediterranean, which is a vital channel for the world’s commerce, will 
remain open and accessible. 
The Mediterranean’s unique geography is the third theme of this thesis.  
Geographically the “Middle Sea” is more than a self-contained lake.  On the contrary, it 
is a passage, an essential link between the Atlantic and the Persian Gulf and beyond.  It 
forms a bridge across which three continents interact.  The Straits and the Black Sea offer 
a back door to Southeastern Europe and Central Asia.  In short, the Mediterranean’s 
geographic position and configuration not only makes the Mediterranean a vital sea lane 
2 
of communication (SLOC) for the world, the Mediterranean connects us with many of 
our allies, and gives us access to some of our enemies. 
But the Mediterranean’s geographic configuration and complex political 
environment also make it an operational challenge, a fourth theme of this thesis.  This is a 
challenge that the United States Navy, with the assistance of our NATO allies, is 
uniquely configured to embrace.  The Mediterranean is the ultimate littoral environment, 
“like putting one’s head into a bag,” as U.S. planners complained during World War II.1  
Navies there never operate far from land, and thus are potentially vulnerable to land-
based air and missile strikes.  At the same time, in the Mediterranean, one is never far 
from more-or-less secure bases.  The complexities and acrimony of Mediterranean 
politics, a fifth theme, calls for the United States Navy to support a variety of missions, 
from “stability and support” to “small-scale contingencies” (SSCs) or potentially more 
conventional operations.  Thus, the politics, economics, and geography of the 
Mediterranean make this region both vital to the interests of the United States and its 
allies as well as a complex operational environment for military forces. 
A. POLITICAL VOLATILITY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION 
The political volatility of a region where the United States continues to have 
significant National interests suggests U.S. Naval Forward Presence cannot be withdrawn 
from the region.  The sources of tension in the greater Mediterranean basin are legion. 
1. Middle East 
Tension between Jews and Arabs has existed for at least a century and shows no 
signs of abating.  The U.S. effort to find a partial resolution to the Middle East quagmire 
                                                 
1 Playfair, I.S.O., The Mediterranean and the Middle East, vol IV, The Destruction of the Axis Forces 
in Africa, London: HMSO, 1966, 124. 
3 
remains a prominent feature of current and future Presidential foreign policy goals.  
President Clinton was able to assemble King Hussein of Jordan, Prime Minister 
Netenyahu and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat on 23 
October 1998 for the signing of the Wye River Memorandum, which gave hope to the 
rejuvenation of the Middle-East Peace Process.  However, the agreement was quickly 
handed significant setbacks following demands by members of Israel’s fractured 
parliament that required the addition of new conditions to the accord.2 
The current tensions between Israel and its Syrian neighbor revolves around the 
armistice arranged by the United Nations following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.  The 
agreement left the Golan Heights area under Syrian control, but that changed when Israel 
occupied the Golan Heights following the Six-Day War in June 1967.  Additionally, they 
seized the high point on Mount Hermon to install sophisticated eavesdropping equipment, 
gained control of major water sources and created new Jewish settlements in the area.3  
Today, the hard- line stance of new Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has escalated the civil 
unrest between Israelis and the Palestinians, leading to continued death and destruction 
on both sides. 
Resource issues are another source of contention in the regions.  Discussions 
between Turkey and Israel regarding the sale of water from the Euphrates and Tigris 
Rivers to Israel have raised concerns with down stream countries.  Water rights will 
likely cause increased tensions between Turkey and its Arab neighbors, Iraq and Syria, 
                                                 
2 Hajjar, Sami G., “The Stalled Peace Process: Israeli-Syrian Track,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed. 
Mediterranean Security: Into the Coming Millennium, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, 315-316. 
3 Ibid, 323. 
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and signals one of the greatest concerns facing Middle Eastern and African countries in 
the future.4 
2. North Africa and Libya 
As in the Middle East, Islamic radicalism and Islamic extremism pose a constant 
threat in North Africa.5  The ongoing insurgency in Algeria poses an additional security 
threat to its neighbors.  The Algerian government is battling the insurgents for political 
legitimacy while attempting to shore up support both from within the local population 
and abroad.6  Unfortunately, the Algerian government does not always seem to be firmly 
in control of its military, which is accused of brutally attacking its own population.  
Algeria has also recently witnessed outbreaks of discontent among the Berber Kabyles of 
Northern Algeria.  Southern European countries like France, Italy and Spain are 
particularly concerned about instability in the Maghreb region, because this usually 
results in increased immigration as people flee from repression and turmoil in their own 
land. 
Libya has remained relatively quiet since the mid 1980’s.  Nevertheless, Qadhafi 
should still be considered a major threat to security and stability within the region.  Libya 
maintains an arsenal of Scud-B missiles that are capable of striking North African 
neighbors and some Italian Islands in the Mediterranean, not to mention United States 
ships in the area.7  If Muamaar Qadhafi gains the capability to arm his Scud-B missiles or 
                                                 
4 Blanche, Ed, “Water Binds Syrian-Iraqi Relations,” Janes Intelligence Review, v. 13, no. 2, February 
2000, p. 7. 
5 Larrabee, Stephen and Thorson, Carla, Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges,  RAND, 
Santa Monica, CA, 1996, p.viii. 
6 Larrabee, Stephen and Thorson, Carla, p.18. 
7 Kenneth B. Moss, “Strategic Choices in the Mediterranean: Europe, the Mediterranean, and the 
5 
those missiles carried by military aircraft with chemical weapons from his arsenal, this 
could seriously de-stabilize the Southern Mediterranean region.  Additionally, Qadhafi 
supports Islamic extremists and has made known his intentions to develop or purchase a 
long-range missile platform that could easily reach Europe.8  Qadhafi proved that he was 
willing to use his SCUD’s in April 1986, when he fired at the United States Coast Guard 
facility on the Italian island of Lampedusa in retaliation for the U.S. strikes against his 
terrorist training sites.9  Concerns over Libya’s future capabilities led to discussions 
between United States and European leaders concerning the necessity of developing a 
ballistic missile defense system that could protect Europe from rogue nations possessing 
weapons of mass destruction.  
3. Turkey/Greece/Cyprus  
Political disagreement between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, territorial rights 
in the Aegean Sea and Turkey’s acceptance into the European Union (EU) continue to 
fester.  Greece gained EU membership during the 1980’s and since then it has worked to 
delay the inclusion of Turkey into the EU.  Greece’s primary goal has been to gain direct 
control of the Aegean, and indirect control of Cyprus.10  However, Greece’s anti-Turkey 
tactics changed following the devastating earthquake that consumed much of 
Northwestern Turkey in August 1999, and caused many EU members to begin a 
                                                 
 
Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, March 2000, available online: 
[http://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/meria/meria00_mok01.html ]. Accessed 17 November 2000. 
8 “The Proliferation Challenge: Regional Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends.” 
[http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/me_na.html ]. Accessed 26 November 2000. 
9 Barletta, Michael and Jorgensen, Erik, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,” Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. 
[http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/use.htm]. May 1999. 
10 Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu, “Turkish Security Challenges in the 1990’s,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed. 
Mediterranean Security: Into the Coming Millennium, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, pp. 265. 
6 
fundamental re-evaluation of their views on Turkey.  A series of bilateral agreements 
between Greece and Turkey have led to improved relations and negotiations aimed at 
enhancing increased tourism, economic and technological cooperation, maritime 
transportation, and fighting organized crime.11 
4. Turkey/Syria 
Kurdish separatism threatens Turkish stability and threatens Turkey’s chances of 
gaining entry into the European Union too.  The Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) has 
acquired sanctuary inside Syrian and Iraqi borders and carries out terrorist actions against 
Turkey from these locations.  Actions by Syria and the PKK put Turkey and Syria on a 
collision course for war on 1 October 1998 following Turkey’s strong warning to Syria to 
stop supporting the PKK.12  Although the situation has been temporarily diffused, Turkey 
has not ruled out future military action pleading national self-defense. 
5. Balkans  
Balkan instability has unsettled European politics since the region was ruled by 
the Ottoman Empire.  Since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, Balkan politicians like Slobodan Miloševic have found it useful to reopen old 
wounds in order to stir up nationalism and ethnic hatred.  When Slobodan Miloševic 
spoke to a crowd numbering one million people on 28 June 1989, the six hundredth 
anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, he re-opened the wounds that were healing among a 
                                                 
11 Moss, Kenneth B., “Strategic Choices in the Mediterranean: Europe, the Mediterranean, and the 
Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, March 2000, available online: 
[http://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/meria/meria00_mok01.html ] [accessed 17 November 2000]. 
12 Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu, “Turkish Security Challenges in the 1990’s,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed. 
Mediterranean Security: Into the Coming Millennium, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, pp. 270. 
7 
people ruled by other countries for so many years.13  This began the unraveling of the 
Yugoslavian government, led Slovenia and Croatia to declare their independence from 
Serbia on 26 June 1991 and helped to instigate the ethnic cleansing and genocide in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. 
These local crises have major regional implications, especially concerning the 
ongoing tensions between Greece and Turkey.  If Macedonia had been drawn more 
deeply into the Kosovo crisis, Turkey may have been tempted to assist large Muslim 
populations there.  Undoubtedly, this would have drawn negative responses from Greece, 
Bulgaria and Serbia because of their one time rule by the Ottoman Empire.  This 
highlights the importance of the crisis in the Republic of Macedonia and reinforces why 
the United States was willing to become involved there during the early stages of the 
Bosnian campaign.  Early United States intervention in Macedonia was seen as a way to 
guarantee United States involvement and prevent trouble from spreading to Southeastern 
Europe.14 
B. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION 
A significant amount of crude oil originating from Persian Gulf countries is 
transported through the Suez Canal enroute to Europe and the United States.  The 
economies of the United States and its European allies greatly rely on safe and relatively 
inexpensive delivery of these fossil fuels.  Therefore, the unimpeded flow of shipping 
throughout the Mediterranean Sea is of vital economic importance to the United States 
                                                 
13 Judah, Tim, “The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia,” Yale University Press, 
New haven, Connecticut, 1997, p. 164. 
14 Moss, Kenneth B., “Strategic Choices in the Mediterranean: Europe, the Mediterranean, and the 
Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 
[http://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/meria/meria00_mok01.html ]. March 2000. 
8 
and its European allies.  On any given day, there are approximately 250 oil tankers 
transiting the Mediterranean Sea.  Thirty percent of the oil delivered into the 
Mediterranean Region transits through the Suez Canal with an additional seventy percent 
arriving at Mediterranean terminals via pipelines.  The annual amount of oil moving 
through the Mediterranean Sea is roughly 360 million tons and nearly 300 million tons of 
this crude oil goes to Mediterranean countries.15 
Throughout 1995, the energy supplied to Europe and the United States from the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was consumed in greater quantities by European 
countries.  In fact, during 1995 Western Europe imported 9.6 million oil barrels/day and 
5.5 million of these were from MENA.  The United States imported 8.8 million oil 
barrels/day during 1995, but only 1.8 million were from MENA. 16  However, the amount 
of oil that the United States acquires through the Mediterranean will see a dramatic 
increase if the proposed Caspian Sea oil pipeline comes to fruition.  American and 
European oil companies are investing great sums of money to ensure that the Caspian Sea 
oil reserves are accessible via the Mediterranean Sea.  Since Turkey is balking at the 
expected increases in oil tanker traffic through the Bosporus for safety reasons, an 
overland route dubbed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route would deliver the Azeri oil to 
Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. 17 Additionally, an overland route would reduce 
the risks posed by operating large oil tankers within the very narrow Turkish Straits. 
                                                 
15 “Oil Maritime Traffic.” [http://wwwrempec.org/oil_traffic.html]. 21 April 2001 
16 Ragionieri, Rodolfo, “Europe, The Mediterranean and the Middle East,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed. 
Mediterranean Security: Into the Coming Millennium, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, p. 419.  
17 United States Energy Information Administration, “Caspian--Bosporus/Black Sea Issues,” 
[http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/caspblk.html].  10 May 2001.  
9 
The economic impact that U.S. naval forces have on the economy when they are 
present or sent forward to regain or maintain peace and stability in the Mediterranean 
Region is difficult to quantify.  However, using the 1996 Taiwan Strait incident involving 
Taiwan’s presidential elections and China’s announcement that it would conduct live-fire 
exercises off the Taiwanese coast as an example, it can be shown that regional instability 
can prompt an economic downturn in European security markets and beyond.  Hong 
Kong’s Hang Seng index took a 7.3 percent dive at the height of the crisis on 11 March 
1996, but quickly began to recover following affirmative action by the United States 
Navy.  Positive reaction to news that the U.S.S. Nimitz would join the U.S.S. 
Independence in the Taiwan Strait to monitor Chinese live-fire exercises assisted with a 
rapid market recovery on 12 March 1996.18 
Maintaining security of vital sea- lanes of communication (SLOC) is important to 
furthering free trade between the United States, Europe, North Africa and the Middle 
East.  This has become increasingly true with the advent of the global economy.  The 
United States, which has not relied upon export trade as much as most other countries is 
now starting to push for a larger portion of the world’s export market share.  Although 
the export trade figures are not huge, U.S. gross domestic product figures from exports 
increased from 7 percent in 1986, to 11 percent in 1996.  United States trade with Eastern 
Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Turkey, now account for an average annual 
growth rate of 9 percent and Israel is up 12 percent per year.19  Therefore it is important 
to maintain economic stability in the Mediterranean Region to guarantee that the free 
                                                 
18 Goure, Dan, Mauldin, Dewey, and Kruel, John, “Naval Forward Presence: Present Status, Future 
Prospects,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 55. 
19 Goure, Dan, Mauldin, Dewey, and Kruel, John, p.52. 
10 
flow of trade between the United States and its European trading partners remains 
uninterrupted. 
C. GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 
SEA 
The geographical diversity of the Mediterranean Sea and the surrounding 
landscape reflects the unique make-up of the region.  Covering an area of nearly 970,000 
square miles, the Mediterranean Sea is a fraction of the size of the Atlantic Ocean’s 31 
million square miles.  Adding the area covered by the Black Sea, which may have a 
profound effect upon Mediterranean commerce in the coming years, only increases the 
area to approximately 1.1 million square miles.20  However, looking only at the small 
size of the Mediterranean does not do justice to its overwhelming importance as a major 
thoroughfare for military and commercial shipping interests.  The Mediterranean Sea 
functions as the transportation hub responsible for connecting the Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans as well as the Black and Red Seas through key straits.  The Strait of Gibraltar, the 
Turkish Straits of the  Aegean-Dardanelles-Bosporous and the Suez Canal link the 
Mediterranean to vitally important areas of interest to the United States, NATO and its 
European Allies.  The 1990’s highlighted the strategic importance of maintaining secure 
logistical support for military forces of the United States and NATO Allies.  During the 
Persian Gulf War, 95 percent of the supplies were delivered via sealift, and of those 
delivered, 90 percent transited from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean and finally 
through the Suez Canal enroute to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.21  These figures 
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emphasize the very reason why the United States must remain engaged in the 
Mediterranean Region to ensure our European allies security and to share in the 
economic benefits occurring from the new global economy. 
From the western entrance at the Strait of Gibraltar to the western shores of 
Lebanon is over 2,000 nautical miles.  Yet, the breadth of the Mediterranean Sea varies 
from approximately 500 nautical miles between France and Algeria, to less than 83 miles 
at the Strait of Sicily.22  Considering an average speed of advance equaling 20 knots, it 
would take an aircraft carrier battle group (CVGB) or amphibious ready group (ARG) 
100 hours to transit this expanse of water from east to west.  The mean water depth is 
4,900 feet with a maximum of 16,896 feet off the southern coast of Greece.23 
Finally, the geographical complexity of the sea itself is matched by the diversity 
of the landmasses it links.  The desert regions of Africa are intermingled with mountains 
that ring the southern Mediterranean coastline.  Europe’s southern coastline is 
mountainous as well and provides additional difficulty to the overland transportation 
routes that connect Europe to the Persian Gulf.  In addition, Western Europe’s land route 
to Iran and Iraq passes through the politically volatile and mountainous terrain located in 
the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.  Likewise, the Maghreb 
countries of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia must transit across the politically 
unpredictable land of Libya to reach Egypt and the Middle East.  In short, the lands that 
border the Mediterranean are, in reality a series of “islands”, both political and 
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geographic, that the sea connects.24  Therefore, safety and freedom of navigation in the 
Mediterranean Sea is of vital importance to continued trade and economic prosperity of 
all countries in the Mediterranean Region, and beyond. 
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II. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF UNITED STATES 
INTERVENTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THROUGH 1945 
 
 
From the end of the World War II to the end of the Cold War the Navy-Marine 
Corps team responded to some 190 crises around the globe, on average about one crisis-
response operation every eleven weeks.25  In the Mediterranean Region, United States 
naval forces intervened on average every five months during this period.26   These crises 
ranged from numerous interventions in wars between Arab and Israeli forces, the Korean 
War, Vietnam, relief assistance following natural disasters, non-combat evacuation 
operations (NEO) and a quarantine around Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
October 1962.  They are all examples of how United States Naval Forward Presence 
provided support to the many different situations occurring around the world.  
Approximately 80 percent of these circumstances required a CVBG, ARG, Marine Corps 
aviation units, land-based naval aircraft or a mixed composition of these units. 
After the Cold War ended, it seemed likely that United States military 
involvement in crisis resolution would begin a steady decline. But just the opposite has 
occurred.  Following the end of the Cold War, the aircraft carrier and amphibious ready 
groups intervened in 75 crises between 1990-1997.  On average, maritime forces 
responded to a different crisis every three and one-half weeks.  This tempo equates to 
naval forces being called upon more than twice as often as during the Cold War.27  The 
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United States accepted its role as the sole remaining superpower during the 1990’s and 
increased involvement in conflict resolution.  However, American military involvement, 
and especially United States Naval Forward Presence in distant foreign regions, is hardly 
a new trend.  On the contrary, United States Naval Forward Presence in the 
Mediterranean Region is an old story that began nearly 200 years ago, and one that 
testifies to a long-standing American interest in the region. 
 
A. SHORES OF TRIPOLI 
Historically, the United States has found it necessary to intervene in the 
Mediterranean to protect its own interests and the safety of United States citizens living 
there.  In the early 19th Century, United States naval vessels began making frequent 
voyages to the Mediterranean Sea, to protect American merchantmen under attack by 
Barbary pirates operating out of Tangier, Algiers, Tunisia and Tripoli.  These states 
demanded tribute in return for safe passage through the Mediterranean Sea.  Tributes 
increased the costs of operating in the Mediterranean and were viewed as a violation of 
freedom of the seas as well as an invasion of United States ships’ sovereignty. 
Although the United States paid its first tribute of 80,000 dollars for immunity 
from pirate attacks in 1784, the Dey of Algiers nevertheless confiscated two United 
States merchant ships in 1785.  He demanded a ransom of 60,000 dollars for return of one 
of the ships and its 21 crewmen. 28  Although the United States did want the crewmen 
returned, the ransom was not paid until ten years later in 1795.  The United States was 
interested in stopping piracy against its merchant fleet, so a 50-year Treaty of Friendship 
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was struck with Morocco in 1787.  However, Portugal and Algiers signed a treaty in 1793 
that allowed pirates from Algiers to enter the Atlantic Ocean via the Strait of Gibraltar. 
After the treaty was signed, Algerine pirates were allowed to pass westward through the 
strait and began confiscating American merchantmen and their ships for ransom.  The 
culmination of these events led the United States to begin to develop a more robust naval 
force that could protect the United States’ trade interests.  Even so, by 1800 the United 
States had paid nearly 2,000,000 dollars or nearly 20 percent of the United States’ 
income, in ransom and tributes to the Barbary States.29  This was predominantly due the 
United States’ inability to build enough naval vessels that could be forward deployed for 
protection of American merchant ships.  Nor could the Royal Navy provide security 
because its mission of fighting the French caused it frequently to violate freedom of the 
seas by boarding United States merchant ships and impressing United States seamen into 
their navy. 
The period of the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon (1798-1815) were 
also a time when freedom of the seas was challenged.  On 2 July 1796, the French 
government authorized United States ships to be seized if their crew list was inaccurate.  
This act alone caused the seizure of over three hundred United States ships in 1797 by 
French privateers.  The X, Y, Z Affair in 1797 so agitated the Americans that it led to the 
creation of the Department of the Navy on 30 April 1798.30  This incident occurred when 
President John Adams sent three representatives to France with the hope of signing a new 
                                                 
29 Schwalbe, David, “the Tripolitan War.” 
[http://americanhistory.about.com/homework/americanhistory/library/weekly/bltripol.htm.] 3 June 1998 
30 Hagan, Kenneth J., In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1984, 
Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1984, pp. 28-34. 
16 
treaty of friendship and trade.  However, three French agents identified as X, Y, and Z 
attempted to gain bribes from the three American envoys.  When Congress found out 
about the French agents’ demands, their severe reaction led to the birth of the Department 
of the Navy. 
When Thomas Jefferson became President in 1801, he became so concerned with 
Mediterranean maritime security that he dispatched naval sloops to the Mediterranean to 
protect United States merchant vessels.  Hoping to regain quick payment of overdue 
American tributes, the Pasha of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli declared war upon the United 
States.  The result was the first Barbary War that began in 1801 and ended on 4 June 
1805.  This was the first combat experience for many famous American sailors such as 
Edward Preble, William Bainbridge and Stephen Decatur.31 
Jefferson’s investment in United States Naval Forward Presence paid its first 
dividend in September 1803 when Commodore Edward Preble obtained the Moroccan 
Sultan’s promise to abide by the 1787 Treaty of Peace.  However, Karamanli was more 
difficult to persuade, especially after 31 October 1803, when Captain William Bainbridge 
ran his ship, Philadelphia, aground and was unable to destroy it before the Tripolitans 
seized it.  Philadelphia’s capture set the stage for one of the most harrowing feats of 
bravery that occurred during this time.  Following the orders of Commodore Prebel, 
Lieutenant Stephen Decatur sailed his captured Tripolitan ketch, renamed Intrepid, into 
Tripoli’s harbor with his crew disguised as Moorish sailors.  When a pirate aboard the 
Philadelphia questioned Decatur’s Sicilian pilot about why he had entered Tripoli’s 
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harbor, the pilot explained that he had lost his anchor and needed to moor alongside a 
ship in the Harbor.  The Tripolitans realized too late that this was a trick.  The Intrepid 
pulled alongside the Philadelphia, disembarked its marines hidden below deck and set 
the Philadelphia on fire.  The actions of Decatur and his men were heralded by Lord 
Horatio Nelson as, “the most bold and daring act of the age.”32 
But while daring, the burning of the Philadelphia did not end the war.  In early 
1805, Captain William Eaton, the former American Counsel to Tunis, devised a plan to 
overthrow the Pasha of Tripoli and replace him with his brother Hamat who was thought 
to be more conciliatory to United States interests.  After convincing Hamat to return to 
Tripoli and remove his brother from power, Eaton assembled a force composed mainly of 
Greek and Egyptian mercenaries with a smattering of United States Marines that would 
march the 700 miles from Alexandria, Egypt to Tripoli to support Hamat’s coup.  Hamat, 
Eaton and a band of troops that eventually numbered 1,200 marched for 40 days and 40 
nights.  Arriving at the Tripolitan port city of Derna, they attacked the fortress with 
supporting fire from three United States ships.  Having seized Derna, however, Eaton was 
in turn besieged by Karamanli’s men.  Eaton and his troops met and repelled continual 
attacks on Derna from the pasha’s troops.  The promise of money provided motivation 
for Hamat’s troops to defeat the current pasha.  However, Captain Eaton, Hamat, the 
American soldiers and Greek mercenaries quietly vacated Derna under the cover of night 
after they discovered that the current American Counsel in Algiers, Tobias Lear, had 
negotiated a peace treaty on 4 June 1805 with Karamanli.  The new peace treaty would 
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prevent Hamat from taking power.33  Eaton and Hamat feared for their lives when they 
realized that the money they had promised would no longer be available for the 
assembled Egyptian soldiers.  So, what did this episode illustrate?  Naval forward 
presence and the seizure of Derna provided the pressure that allowed the new deal to be 
cut with Karamanli.  But there were risks of defeat too.  Also naval forward presence 
needed to be sustained for it to be effective. 
The War of 1812 against Britain forced the United States to reduce its patrols in 
the Mediterranean Sea and allowed the Dey of Algiers to take advantage of the decreased 
American presence.  Once again he extorted tribute from Americans and even threatened 
to detain American Counsel to Algiers, Tobias Lear. The second Barbary Coast War 
began when the United States declared war on the Dey of Algiers on 2 March 1815. 
Stephen Decatur returned to the Mediterranean in 1815 with ten ships to fight Algerine 
pirates and quickly scored a striking blow against the Dey of Algiers when he captured 
the Dey’s finest man-of-war, the Meshouda.  Stephen Decatur’s quick capture of the 
flagship stunned the Dey and led him to sign an agreement stating that United States 
tributes would cease, no further United States ships would be captured, and captive 
United States citizens would be released.  Additionally, most favored trading status was 
granted with the United States and the Dey signed a truce with the United States.34 
Therefore, from our Republic’s earliest days, naval forward presence was 
deployed in the Mediterranean to support United States interests there.  Naval forward 
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presence was effective, especially when part of a general international effort.  In this 
case, after 1815, both the British and French moved to subdue Mediterranean piracy, so 
that United States Naval Forward Presence contributed to an international movement to 
achieve regional stability.  At the same time, these early wars against the Barbary pirates 
illustrated how influential the deployment of naval assets can be in this volatile and 
politically fragmented political environment. 
After 1815, the Mediterranean naval squadron was created to make regular patrols 
throughout the region to safeguard United States fishing, whaling and ever increasing 
national trade throughout the world’s sea- lanes.  Port visits in the Mediterranean showed 
the flag and signaled America’s interests within the region.  The squadron even found 
opportunities to provide assistance to other countries and maintain regional stability.  
During the late 1820’s, piracy re-emerged in the Eastern Mediterranean, as Greeks 
rebelled against their Turkish overlords, creating a climate of instability there.  The 
United States Mediterranean Squadron’s naval intervent ion against piracy restored calm 
to the Aegean Region. 35  Overall, the United States Navy’s actions were relatively 
reserved within the Mediterranean throughout the latter part of the 19th century, basically 
because Great Britain adopted the role as guarantor of Mediterranean stability.  This was 
especially true after the Suez Canal opened on 17 October 1869.  From this moment, the 
Mediterranean ceased to be a lake and instead became an even more important passage 
for maritime trade.  This was true for all nations, but especially for Great Britain because 
of their substantial interests in Hong Kong and India.  Meanwhile the United States’ 
naval interests focused more on Asia as Commodore Matthew Perry’s opening of Japan 
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to United States trade in the 1850’s and the Spanish-American War of 1898 announced 
America’s arrival as a Pacific power.36  With Mediterranean political and commercial 
stability in the hands of the British and secondarily the French, the United States could 
concentrate its naval forward presence in Asia. 
B. EL RAISUNI AND THE PERDICARIS AFFAIR 
 Nevertheless, there were periods when United States Naval Forward Presence in 
the Mediterranean became necessary due to political unrest that directly affected United 
States interests.  As the closest nation to Europe, Morocco was coveted by the 19th 
Century European Great Powers.  However, none was able to absorb it into their colonial 
empires because Great Britain, France, Spain, and Germany could not agree among 
themselves who should take it over.  As a consequence, Morocco was ruled for much of 
the 19th and early 20th Centuries by a weak sultan.  Political unrest there continued to be a 
source of conflict because of Morocco’s strategically important position on the southern 
shore of the Strait of Gibraltar. 
Instability in Morocco revived a situation not unlike that of the Barbary Pirates of 
the late 18th and early 19th Centuries.  In Morocco’s case, these “pirates” were local 
warlords who were able to establish their authority in parts of the Sultan’s realm and live 
by kidnapping and extortion.  One such man was Sherif Moulai Ahmed Ben Mohammed 
el Raisuni who, in 1903, was released from one of the Sultan’s prisons and soon began to 
take his place in Moroccan history.  El Raisuni descended from a prominent Moroccan 
family that traced it lineage back to the Prophet, which gave him great status in Moroccan 
society.  His life changed forever after witnessing a woman distraught with grief and her 
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clothes stained in with the blood of her dead husband.  El Raisuni took revenge upon the 
assassins of her husband and soon developed a very effective protection racket that 
flourished in the more lawless regions of the Moroccan state, which was most of them.  
His acts of bravery during battle were legendary and his success infuriated the political 
leaders of Tangier.  This led to his eventual capture and years of imprisonment.  This 
experience further accentuated his ruthless character. 
 Upon his release, El Raisuni took up the habit of kidnapping influential people in 
the hopes of gaining ransoms for their release.  The celebrated English traveler and writer 
Walter Harris was one of his early captives and was used by El Raisuni and his tribesmen 
as leverage to try and gain the release of 56 captives held in Tangier’s prisons.  When the 
British minister insisted that the list was too large, the tribesmen threatened to kill Harris.  
However, Harris called their bluff and told them that the 56 prisoners would all be killed 
and burned over the next 56 days if he were killed.  Harris was released after being 
detained for 36 hours.  But this only spurred El Raisuni’s desire to go after more 
important prey. 37 
Wealthy European exiles often chose to take up residence in Tangier because of 
its climate, a European diplomatic presence and its inexpensive living.  Ion Perdicarus, an 
American citizen, was one of the wealthy expatriates living in Tangier with his family 
and soon became El Raisuni’s next captive guest.  Having just finished dinner on 18 May 
1904, Perdicarus and his family were startled by the sound of gunfire and a scuffle.  
When Perdicarus and his stepson Cromwell Oliver Varley went to investigate, they were 
captured, bound and mounted on mules by Raisuni’s men.  Raisuni’s demand for a 
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$70,000 ransom for the release of Perdicarus and Varley was considered shockingly high 
for the time.  But even more innovative was Raisuni’s demand that the American consul 
and British minister pledge that the conditions of the demand would be met.38  The 
American consul and British minister fearing for their lives requested assistance from 
their governments. When President Roosevelt got word of the affair he sent immediate 
naval support in the form of six heavy cruisers.  Roosevelt thought that Perdicarus was an 
American citizen and would not allow such atrocities to be committed against the United 
States.  However, it was later brought to Roosevelt’s attention that Perdicarus had 
exchanged his American citizenship for Greek citizenship to prevent his inherited 
property from being taken by the Confederacy during the American Civil War.39 
 Great Britain and the United States dispatched naval vessels to protect their 
diplomatic personnel and to provide a show of force that leaders believed would 
intimidate El Raisuni.  However, he was not intimidated by the men of war twisting at 
anchor just off shore, and waited for the diplomatic entourage that would surely plead for 
the release of his hostages.  Roosevelt’s discomfort with the situation led him to make the 
kind of brash comment that he was famous for when he said, “Perdicarus alive or Raisuli 
dead.”40  However, he did have the strength of naval forward presence on his side and he 
used it as best he could.  The presence of naval forces just off the coast did awaken most 
in Tangiers to the powerful capabilities that the Western powers possessed.  Although it 
was land forces that would be necessary to defeat Raisuni, these troops would arrive by 
sea and receive supporting fire from the cruisers and battleships waiting nearby.  More 
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important was the political effect that naval forward presence had on the situation, 
because Raisuni as well as the Western diplomats realized that Great Britain and the 
United States were willing to support their overseas missions.  Additionally, the political 
success gained by Roosevelt’s use of naval forward presence to intervene in Tangier 
guaranteed his nomination at the Republican convention later that that year. 
French diplomats secured the right to conduct the negotiations with Raisuni, but 
all did not go smoothly.  After the first negotiator’s throat was slit because he was an 
enemy of Raisuni, it was difficult to find new volunteers.  However, the sharif of 
Ouezzane, a holy figure in Morocco and hence exempt from political retribution, finally 
agreed to negotiate with Raisuni and secured the release of Perdicarus and Varley on 25 
June 1904. 
 Raisuni’s successes were numerous following the release of his captives.  He 
rejoiced at the removal of his onetime rival, collected a seventy thousand dollar ransom 
and became the new caid of Tangier.  The French profited too by being allowed to 
establish a French military presence in Tangier that was designed to train the Tangier 
police.  Monetarily they acquired the exclusive right to negotiate loans with the 
Moroccan government and use customs receipts as security for their payment.41 
C. WORLD WAR II 
 World War II was the event that brought the United States Navy back into the 
Mediterranean Sea, and we have remained there ever since.  The Mediterranean Sea was 
a pivotal area for British and United States intervention during World War II.    The 
Mediterranean provided the platform from which the Allied Forces launched their 
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campaign to defeat the European Axis.  The primary benefits of applying allied 
intervention in the Mediterranean was that it: 
· Supported Roosevelt’s “Europe First” strategy. 
· Developed a strong alliance between the United States and Britain. 
· Revived France as an ally. 
· Offered an alternative entry point into Europe for both land and air forces. 
· Provided a place where Allied troops could gain combat experience at 
lower risk, and where Allied forces could identify their best commanders. 
· Attacked the weakest member of the Axis alliance (Italy). 
· Tied down Axis forces and prevented them from creating a strategic 
reserve to be used on the Eastern or Western Fronts. 
Ultimately, President Franklin Roosevelt agreed with Winston Churchill and the 
British military leaders that priority should be given to the Mediterranean in 1942-1943.  
Roosevelt recognized that winning in Europe must be given priority over defeating Japan, 
even though many in the United States, including Admiral Ernest King speaking for the 
United States Navy, called for Japan’s early defeat.  However, Roosevelt recognized that 
he needed to support Great Britain and, above all, keep Russia in the battle against 
Germany.  This required the Western Allies to open up a second front in Europe as soon 
as possible.  Anglo-American ground forces needed to begin a ground campaign before 
the end of 1942, to show the Russians that the United States and Great Britain were its 
true allies.  Entering Europe from the south after securing North Africa became the focus 
of allied forces and would provide an excellent opportunity for United States troops to 
gain valuable combat experience.42 
                                                 
42 Parker, R.A.C., The Second World War: A Short History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, 
pp. 117-118. 
25 
The tide of battle in the Mediterranean turned in August 1942 when British 
General Bernard Montgomery arrived in Egypt to launch a successful campaign that 
ultimately led to the defeat of German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel.  The North African 
campaign relied heavily upon United States logistical and combat support.  Additionally, 
fighting for control of North Africa provided a second front that effectively diverted Axis 
personnel, aircraft, tanks and submarines that might have been used more profitably on 
the Eastern Front, weakening Hitler’s ability to conquer Russia.  Operation TORCH 
brought United States and British troops ashore in French Morocco and Algeria on 7 
November 1942, marking the allies’ joint commitment to, as well as the revival of French 
participation in, the war.43  TORCH also provided the environment that United States 
soldiers needed to season them for the brutal combat that awaited them on the shores of 
Normandy and the plains of Central Europe.  Allied successes helped to ease French 
resistance toward the allies within the first days of Operation TORCH and bolstered 
allied attempts to push east toward Tunis. 
During the North African campaign, the Axis relied principally upon maritime 
supply lines across the Sicilian Narrows to Tripoli and eventually Tunis.  The allied 
ability gradually to constrict the Axis supply structure during the summer of 1942 
significantly slowed Rommel’s’ advance eastward and prevented him from capturing 
Alexandria, the main base of the Royal Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and gaining 
control of the Suez Canal.  This would have been catastrophic for British forces in Egypt 
who relied on shipments through the Red Sea and Suez Canal.  British intelligence’s 
ability to decipher German and Italian messages was one of the greatest contributing 
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factors that allowed British aircraft to intercept desperately needed logistics shipments for 
Panzerarmee Afrika.  Additionally, control of the Mediterranean Sea prevented Hitler’s 
forces from gaining access to vital oil resources in Iran and Iraq. 
Operation FLAX, one of the most important allied operations conducted in the 
Mediterranean during the spring of 1943, spelled the death of the Axis in North Africa.  
Allied surface ships, submarines and aircraft reduced Axis supply ships enroute to Tunis 
to a trickle, a supply deficit that could not be made up by German transport aircraft.  The 
losses attributed to Operation FLAX and the general offensive push toward Tunisia cost 
both sides very heavily.  Germany suffered 155,000 casualties, lost 2,422 Luftwaffe 
aircraft and many pilots during the Tunisia campaign.  Over 230,000 Axis troops 
surrendered in Tunisia in May 1943, a number that equaled in scale the Soviet victory at 
Stalingrad in February of that year.   Additionally, there was a combined loss to the 
German and Italian shipping force equaling 506 ships.  The losses suffered by Germany 
and Italy significantly contributed to “the unraveling of the defense of Fortress 
Europe.”44 
After the fall of North Africa, allied strategic priorities began to diverge.  The 
issue that separated Churchill from the American, and indeed many of his British 
Commanders, was: how much more strategic benefit could the allies squeeze from the 
Mediterranean. The Americans were itching to get into the battle in Western Europe 
while Churchill believed that the Balkans offered the most promising avenue of attack.  
Churchill also reasoned that the Mediterranean was a British sphere of influence and 
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therefore if Great Britain could shore up its defenses around Europe’s southern flank, 
they could repel Russia’s future expansion southward, while protecting their SLOCs to 
the Empire.  The initial compromise reached at the Casablanca Conference of January 
1943 was to invade Sicily (Operation HUSKY).  This would definitely clear the 
Mediterranean SLOC’s and position the allies within striking distance of Italy.  Operation 
HUSKY was launched in July 1943, the largest amphibious operation as yet attempted by 
the allies.  Husky saw the birth of allied combined operations and was an important 
precursor to OVERLORD, the invasion of Normandy.  In addition, Naval artillery was 
important to the survival of the American beachhead at Gela, and the advance of the 7th 
United States and 8th British armies along the coasts toward Messina.  Despite clashes 
between Generals Bernard Montgomery and George Patton, HUSKY furthered the 
advancement of the most close knit and successful alliances in the history of warfare.  
The invasion also led to the overthrow of Mussolini and began the process that resulted in 
Italy’s withdrawal from the war.  In the Mediterranean, it was the precursor to the 
amphibious assaults at Salerno, Anzio, and ANVIL, the invasion of Southern France in 
August 1944. 
The Mediterranean Region proved to be the pivotal region with regards to the 
Allied strategy of maintaining the “Europe First” policy.  Many argued that the way to 
defeat the Axis powers was by immediately taking it to them on the plains of Western 
Europe.  However, the Allies did not have the requisite equipment or experienced troops 
to carry out this campaign until 1943 or 1944.  American naval commanders in the 
Pacific pushed to defeat the Japanese first, but Roosevelt realized that Britain and the 
Soviet Union must first be saved or the war in Europe would be lost.  The Mediterranean 
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provided the theater where Naval power could attack Axis land power.  By directing a 
concerted attack on the Axis supply lines from Southern Europe to Tripoli, the British 
and Americans were able defeat Field Marshall Rommel in North Africa and divert vital 
Axis reserve forces to the Mediterranean instead of the Eastern Front and the battles with 
Russia.  Finally, the Allies were able to mount their offensive into Europe southern flank 
and make final preparations for the landings at Normandy. 
Furthermore, United States participation in the Mediterranean established the 
United States and its naval forces in an area where each would play a vital and 
complementary role during the post-World War II world that continues to this day.  The 
retraction of British power from the Mediterranean and communist dictatorship in 
Yugoslavia left the region without a stabilizing democratic protector until the United 
States accepted the role in 1947.  This placed the United States Sixth Fleet at the southern 
reaches of the Soviet Union where it acted as a force for stability during the many crises 
that rocked the Eastern Mediterranean after 1945.  These crises were a product of the 
founding of Israel in 1948 and the rise of Arab nationalism that destabilized the 
monarchies of Iraq, Egypt, and Libya.  Finally, independence gained by former French 
and Italian colonies in the Levant and North Africa brought political uncertainty that 
threatened in some measure a revival of the Barbary Pirates.  This new political situation 









III. MAINTAINING UNITED STATES NAVAL FORWARD 
PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
 
 
A. THE VALUE OF NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE 
The formation of NATO in April 1949 provided a mechanism for the containment 
of communism. As the most powerful Western nation, the United States has assumed a 
leading role in the Alliance.  Additionally, NATO’s formation ensured that the United 
States would continue to forward deploy naval forces to the Mediterranean to reinforce 
Europe’s southern flank an insure that the Mediterranean Sea continues to play its role as 
an important maritime passage.  To do this, the United States was forced to take up a 
mission gradually relinquished by Great Britain after World War II.  United States Naval 
Forward Presence in the Mediterranean Region provides many important advantages to 
the United States and our allies before conflicts erupt, during time of war, or in support of 
peacekeeping/making operations.  Utilizing naval vessels and prepositioning ships 
operating in or near likely theaters of operation: 
· Deters potential troublemakers.  
· Reassures our allies that we are committed to the region.  
· Prevents them from overreacting to situations. 
· Provides the constant presence required to allow time for diplomatic 
solutions a time to work. 
· United States naval vessels are sovereign U.S. territory and therefore are 
not subject to the same political constraints as land-based forces. 
· Significantly reduces reaction time and transportation expenses for U.S. 
military response should conflict occur. 
In 1947, the Foreign Office informed the United States that London would no 
longer be able to supply financial assistance to Turkey and Greece and intended to 
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remove British troops from Greece.45  In the aftermath of World War II, the British were 
experiencing major defense commitments in India, Egypt and Palestine, as well as 
Germany and the Far East.  Reacting to Civil War in Greece during May 1946, President 
Truman quickly accepted a new leadership role for the United States.  The Truman 
Doctrine enunciated on 12 March 1947, marked the beginning of Washington’s 
acceptance of a post-World War II global role for the United States.  Truman promised 
$400 million dollars worth of relief aid for Greece and Turkey. 46  Furthermore, this 
began the practice of the United States, and eventually NATO, as a mechanism to restrain 
Greek and Turkish rivalry in the strategically important region joining the Black Sea with 
the Mediterranean. 
Additional aid from the United States was allocated to a plan that allowed former 
European allies, neutrals and enemies in to regain economic stability.  The Marshall Plan, 
activated in 1948 and named after President Truman’s Secretary of State, General George 
Marshall, directed the majority of these funds to Great Britain and France, but other 
European countries benefited as well.  Marshall Plan recipients collected a total of $13.2 
billion dollars in aid.  Stalin forbade countries controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics from participating in the program. 47  The retrenchment of Great Britain, the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and the emerging Cold War provided the 
political foundation for United States Naval Forward Presence in the Mediterranean. 
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The primary role of United States Naval Forward Presence in the Mediterranean 
Region is to deter trouble there, and during the Cold War there were ample opportunities 
to do this.  Instability within the European and Mediterranean Regions occurred because 
of significant land grabs carried out against East European countries by the Soviet Union 
and the 1949 testing of their atom bomb.  United States leaders grew concerned that the 
Soviet Union would soon push southward into the Mediterranean.  Therefore, by 1951 
United States fleet presence grew from 3 ships to 16 ships with one of these being an 
aircraft carrier.  This number grew even larger to about 70 United States military vessels 
during the course of the Cold War, which also saw a surge of Soviet military ships in the 
Mediterranean. 48    Soon, the Mediterranean Sea became a focal point of tension between 
Soviet aggression and the United States’ Cold War policies aimed at resisting Soviet 
expansion.  Crises erupted, but from the end of the Greek Civil War, there was no attempt 
by the USSR, or one of its satellites, to seize a Mediterranean country, as they had in 
Central Europe with Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
The United States’ Naval Forward Presence has also deterred conflict, while 
promoting interoperability and cooperation between NATO allies Greece and Turkey.  
This has not always been an easy task.  But continuing efforts to bind these two 
adversaries into the NATO alliance have made a difference.  Interoperability exercises 
provide additional benefits by peacetime training of Mediterranean partners on how to 
execute NATO tactics, so that they can operate effectively to counter an adversary during 
an emergency.    By engaging both countries in NATO exercises and security assistance 
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programs, the United States has provided them with constant reminders that their NATO 
membership responsibilities override their national differences and impose common 
obligations.49  Additionally, the United States Navy has allowed neither side to prevent 
United States aircraft or ships from operating in their zones of responsibility.  
“Meanwhile, Greece and Turkey have begun negotiations on a series of bilateral 
agreements affecting tourism, economic and technological cooperation, maritime 
transportation, and fighting organized crime among other things,” writes Center for Naval 
Analyses Research Manager Henry H. Gaffney in 1995.”50 
Equally as important as maintaining interoperability and preventing overreaction 
to situations between quarrelsome NATO neighbors are the functions carried out by 
Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM).  Established in 1992, SNFM is 
comprised of naval forces from Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.51  This organization provides very important 
opportunities for military-to-military cooperation and oils the military mechanisms 
required to resolve diplomatic crises.  The members of this alliance offer the valuable 
example of the cohesive teamwork required to carry out important cooperative operations 
like those conducted during Operation MARITIME MONITOR and Operation ALLIED 
FORCE.52  Additionally, they conduct highly visible port visits and Partnership for Peace 
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exercises.53  SNFM capabilities could become more enhanced in the future and allow 
them to conduct non-article 5 missions (missions such as peacekeeping/peacemaking that 
fall under United Nations sponsorship, even though they may be commanded by NATO 
members) if they were provided necessary big-deck amphibious platforms and enhanced 
technical equipment such as Aegis radar equipped naval vessels.54  United States naval 
forces assigned to SNFM can provide vital tactical training information to the other allied 
members.  But the ultimate goal should be to work toward equipment improvements 
across the board for all participating countries.  Without them the United States will be 
unable to communicate or operate effectively with its allies during times of conflict. 
B. ARAB/ISRAELI WARS 
The Middle East has witnessed wars between neighbors since the end of World 
War II.  United States Naval Forward Presence has been there to reassure our allies that 
we are committed to preventing situations there from escalating beyond the point of no 
return.  Additionally, naval forward presence has remained within striking range of our 
allies’ enemies and this has allowed diplomatic solutions a chance to mediate most 
situations there.  Even so, the religious fervor that exists within the region has caused 
flare-ups that continue to threaten the Middle East Peace Process. 
During what has been a series of wars and conflicts between 1948 and the current 
day, Israeli, Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian armed forces have battled over strategic 
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strips of land in the eastern region of the Mediterranean.  The United States supported 
Israel during these conflicts by dispatching the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean, 
while the Soviet Union provided support to the surrounding Arab nations.  Additionally, 
having United States naval forces forward deployed to the Mediterranean has ensured 
that Washington remains engaged both militarily and diplomatically to prevent any of the 
protagonists from overreacting to tense situations. 
Egyptian President Nasser’s actions during the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis caused 
considerable anxiety for the United States, Great Britain, France, and Israel.  His decision 
to nationalize the Suez Canal and enact a series of tolls for its use was unacceptable to 
these countries.  President Nasser’s primary motive was to raise funds to finance 
construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile River.  The United States and Great Britain 
decided to withdraw construction aid for the project after President Nasser persisted in 
his efforts to acquire Soviet weapons.55  The United States was monitoring the situation 
via U-2 reconnaissance flights out of Turkey when they noticed the military build up of 
Israeli, French and British forces near the Suez Canal.  This caused United States leaders 
to shift the 6th Fleet forces, operating near Crete, to the Egyptian coast.  Such a pre-
emptive move by pre-positioned ships was ostensibly designed to facilitate the quick 
evacuation of American citizens from Israel and Egypt should the need arise.  Eventually, 
nearly 3,000 Americans were withdrawn from Egypt and Israel.56  But, it also signaled 
                                                 
55 McNeill, J.R., “Ecology and Strategy in the Mediterranean: Points of Intersection,” in John B. 
Hattendorf, ed. Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future, Frank Cass, 
London, 2000, p. 374. 
56 Miskel, James F., “US Post-war Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean Region,” in John B. 
Hattendorf, ed. Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future, Frank Cass, 
London, 2000, p. 153. 
35 
our continued interest in the region and our desire to force a diplomatic solution on the 
conflict. 
Israel, Britain and France planned an invasion that would allow Israeli troops to 
attack Palestinian terrorists located in Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula.  Having dealt with 
the Palestinians, the Israeli troops planned to continue toward Egypt.  Next, British and 
French troops would then enter Egypt to act a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli 
forces.  The explanation for their actions revolved around French fears of losing 
monetary compensation from the canal and the Britain feared the loss of necessary oil 
shipments through the Suez Canal.  Additionally, the French resented President Nasser’s 
assistance of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) during Algeria’s war for 
independence from France that began in October 1954. 
The situation concluded with a United Nations cease-fire agreement that was 
forced upon the French, British and Israelis by United States led diplomatic pressure.57  
Because the Soviets and Nasser stood up to the NATO allies and Israel, the Suez Canal 
Crisis allowed President Nasser and the Soviets to gain prowess in the Arab world, while 
the United States and her NATO allies lost face in the region.  Even so, the Israeli army 
proved that it had the capability to threaten Egypt and most likely could have beaten the 
Egyptian army had it not been halted by the UN mandated cease-fire. 
June 1967 found the Middle East embroiled in yet another military conflict.  Israel 
felt compelled to protect its rights to freedom of navigation when Egyptian President 
Nasser closed off the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.  This served as Israel’s vital link 
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to the Red Sea and important supply routes beyond.  Israel saw this partial blockade as a 
pretext for war.  Israeli troops quickly launched a simultaneous, pre-emptive attack upon 
Egypt and Syria in response to President Nasser’s actions.  Israel’s success shocked the 
Arabs and humbled the Soviet Union ?  Egypt and Syria fought with Soviet weapons, 
directed by Soviet advisors and still were defeated by an Israeli Army greatly inferior in 
number.  The Six-Day War allowed Israel to establish new borders around newly 
conquered territory.  The West bank of Jordan, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula 
provided Israel with strategically important positions from which they could maintain a 
watchful eye over their Arab neighbors.58 
The next major Arab/Israeli War, the Yom Kippur War, was launched by Egypt 
and Syria on 6 October 1973 in an attempt to reclaim territory lost in the June 1967 Six-
Day War.  The Arab states also wanted to re-establish the homelands of 2.75 million 
Palestinian Arabs who had been displaced and who were living in squalor since the Six-
Day War.59  The surprise attack allowed Egyptian troops to over-run Israeli positions on 
the eastern side of the Suez Canal at the Bar Lev Line.  After initial success both by 
Syrian troops in the Golan Heights and Egyptians at Suez, the Israelis mounted a strong 
counter-offensive that dislodged the Syrians and Egyptians.  What followed was a 
powerful surge into the Sinai Peninsula and across the Suez Canal, where Israeli forces 
threatened to destroy the Egyptian Third Army and take Cairo.60 
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Israel’s successes caused President Nixon to increase all nuclear forces to 
DEFCON III alert status during the Yom Kippur War. President Nixon’s actions were in 
response to Leonid Brezhnev’s threat to use unilateral force to enforce the 23 October 
1967 cease-fire resolution. 61  Although tensions were high and significant posturing was 
conducted around each other’s vessels, the United States and the Soviet Union did not 
commit acts serious enough to begin World War III. 
During the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973, American aircraft carriers were 
stationed nearby in the Mediterranean to deter the Soviet Union and other outside parties 
from interfering.  Stationing the aircraft carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean near Israel 
sent a clear and unambiguous message to the Soviets that the United States would not 
tolerate direct military intervention on behalf of the Arab states.  Even so, the Soviet 
Union was able to deliver Moroccan reinforcements into Syria via Soviet ships.  To 
counter Soviet support of the Arabs, the United States flew replacement aircraft to Israel, 
utilizing a leap-frog technique that enabled the A-4 aircraft to land on carriers stationed 
along the route.  Once on deck, the aircraft were re- fueled before re- launching them to 
continue their journey to Israel. 62  The ability of aircraft carriers, sovereign United States 
territory, to relay reinforcements was made even more important after Wheelus Air Base 
in Libya was lost during Muamaar Qadhafi’s military coup of 1970. 
The deterrent effect of United States Naval Forward Presence during the 
Arab/Israeli Wars cannot be underestimated.  It was the direct pressure of United States 
diplomats, backed up by the naval forces present in the Eastern Mediterranean that forced 
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the warring parties to the peace tables.  Prepositioning the Sixth fleet in the region 
allowed this action to occur more quickly before the hostilities got too far out of control.  
Additionally, during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, United States forward deployed naval 
units and diplomatic engagement in the Mediterranean Region were responsible for 
preventing Israeli troops from destroying the Egyptian 6th Army or entering Cairo, 
thereby, ensuring that Soviet troops would not attempt unilateral intervention on the part 
of Egypt. 
C. LEBANON 1958 TO 1983 
Lebanon has been another area where United States Naval Forward Presence 
encouraged the de-escalation of violence and bought time for diplomatic solutions to 
prevail.  During the Cold War, United States Naval Forward Presence in the 
Mediterranean grew as we strived to implement our policy of containment.  There were 
radical forces within the Middle East and Mediterranean Region’s that caused concern to 
Western leaders.  Radical Islam was gaining popularity throughout the region and 
threatened the stability of our allies.  Lebanon represented a rare situation in the Middle 
East, because its population is almost evenly divided between Muslims and Christians.  
However, Cairo and Damascus fanned the flames of Muslim radicalism with propaganda 
and cash, to incite Lebanese Muslim extremists to take up arms against their Lebanese 
Christian neighbors.  Lebanese Muslims armed with Soviet weaponry quickly began to 
attack the Christian- led government.  When Lebanon’s Christian President Camille 
Chamoun questioned the United States Ambassador on 11 May 1958 about Washington’s 
willingness to assist his government, he received a positive response.  Following a 
revolutionary outbreak in Iraq on 14 July 1958, President Chamoun requested United 
States assistance.  Twenty-four hours later, on 15 July 1958, United States Marines began 
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to land in Beirut.  The landing met no resistance so that the marines soon controlled the 
city’s harbor and the airport.  United States forces peaked at around 15,000 men before 
they began a complete withdrawal that was completed by 25 October 1958.63  Overall, 
fighting was relatively contained and only one Marine casualty occurred. 
The Lebanese intervention served two purposes:  first, it created an environment 
for talks between President Chamoun, United States Special Representative to the 
Lebanon, Robert Murphy, and the rebels to begin to resolve the crisis. Second, it 
reassured our allies that the United States was willing and able to protect them from 
invading forces or civil war with more than words.  It enforced the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
which called for the United States to support any nation or group of nations that 
requested assistance through military intervention.  Instability and civil upheaval in 
Lebanon gave the United States the opportunity to prove its commitment to the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.64  
1. The Limitations of Naval Forward Presence 
American intervention during 1958 proved both operationally and strategically 
effective.  However, the crisis- intervention carried out by United States Marines and 
naval forces during 1983 proved to be a failure for two reasons.  First, the Sixth Fleet and 
multinational forces’ ability to stop the violence in Lebanon was undermined by the 
changing political climate in Lebanon.  Radical elements supported by the Soviet Union 
and radical Moslem factions had by 1983 created a political environment that was not 
amenable to reconciliation.  Second, the American reluctance to intervene in foreign 
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conflicts as the result of the experience of the Vietnam War was after the United States 
Marines Corps barracks bombing tragedy.  This precipitated the United States withdrawal 
from Lebanon.  The American people were simply unwilling to pay a high price for 
Lebanese political stability.    
President Reagan was determined to assist the Lebanese Army in removing 
members of the PLO, Syrians and Israelis from Lebanon and the mission initially 
progressed with minimal casualties.  United States Marines were part of a multinational 
force that evacuated over 12,000 PLO members from Lebanon before they themselves 
departed on 10 September 1982.  However, when newly elected Lebanese President, 
Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated on 14 September 1982, the marines were again landed 
in Lebanon to insure stability. 
When Syrian backed Moslem rebels began firing upon members of the 
multinational force, the United States naval forces began a Naval bombardment of the 
rebel positions in support of Lebanese Army units.  President Reagan decided to employ 
40-year old naval artillery that many criticized as antiqua ted during a time when nuclear 
weapons were the rule.  After the United States Navy’s battle ship New Jersey arrived on 
station with its 16-inch guns and 2,000-pound shells, a shaky cease-fire was almost 
immediately achieved. 
In 1982, United States Marines met much greater resistance from rebel Moslem 
fanatics than they had during their 1958 mission to Lebanon.  The primary reason for 
increased resistance was Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, which effectively united hitherto 
divided Moslem groups into a coherent opposition.  Armed with Soviet weapons, trained 
by Soviet military personnel and backed by Iranian money, Moslem extremists were 
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capable of mounting a more coordinated campaign of armed attacks and terrorism.  
President Reagan had promised PLO leader Yassir Arafat that the Israeli troops would 
protect the remaining Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.  But the Israelis looked the 
other way when Lebanese Christians killed nearly 800 Palestinians in the refugee camps 
of Sabra and Shatila.65  President Reagan quickly returned the multinational 
peacekeepers to be near the camps.  But this angered the Shi’ite Moslems who did not 
want long-term western intervention in Lebanon and who considered United States 
forces, not without reason, to be defacto allies of Israel.  Multiple terrorist actions against 
the peacekeepers quickly undermined President Reagan’s desire to remain in Lebanon. 
On 23 October 1983, a very large terrorist truck bomb detonated by a radical Shi’ite 
Moslem killed 240 United States Marines as they slept in their barracks.  The French 
headquarters were hit by a second terrorist truck bomb that killed 80 French 
paratroopers.66 
Although President Reagan made a valiant attempt to retrieve the situation by 
continued use of naval bombardment and a 28-plane strike upon Syrian air defense 
headquarters on 4 December 1983, the multinational force had forfeited the initiative in 
Lebanon to radical Shiite Moslems who had escalated the conflict beyond the threshold 
the multinational forces were willing to cross.67  In the end, Sixth Fleet forces proved 
unable “to promote the interests of the United States in the Lebanon or to mitigate the 
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sufferings of a people plunged into anarchy and chaos by the collapse of an artificial 
compromise that alone sustained the existence of a state that never became a nation.”68 
D. LIBYA DURING THE 1980’S 
Actions taken against Libya throughout the 1980’s offer a prime example of how 
naval forward presence is employed to deter rogue states.  United States air strikes 
against Libya highlight another capability of naval forward presence.  By positioning two 
carrier battle groups near the Libyan coast and supplying necessary striking power and 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) during the air strikes they provided critical 
offensive and defensive weapons capabilities required successfully to conduct strike 
warfare.  Libya’s belligerency attracted United States attention on 19 October 1973 when 
Libya’s President Muamaar Qadhafi proclaimed that the Gulf of Sidra constituted an 
integral part of its territory under Libya’s sovereign control.  In doing so, Qadhafi 
challenged the right to freedom of navigation within this area, which far exceeded the 12 
nautical mile territorial sea claim contained within the rules of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention. 69  This was particularly disturbing to United States naval forces that rely 
upon freedom of navigation to maintain safe and effective sea- lanes of communication. 
While the United States conducted a freedom of navigation exercise in the Gulf of Sidra 
on 19 August 1981, a Libyan jet shot a heat-seeking missile at a United States F-14 
Tomcat operating from the USS Nimitz.  This forced the F-14 and his wingman to the 
shoot down two Libyan jets.70 
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During the spring of 1986, relations between Libya and the United States became 
increasingly antagonistic and led to serious military repercussions for Qadhafi.  The 
United States was conducting exercises off of the Libyan coast with three carrier task 
forces in March 1986 when Libyan military forces launched six long-range surface-to-air 
(SA-5) missiles against American airplanes.  Although no damage was done to the United 
States aircraft, two retaliatory air strikes were conducted against the missile launch 
facility at Surt, Libya.  After this incident, President Reagan received information from 
intelligence sources that a bomb explosion at a Berlin nightclub in April 1986 was the act 
of a Libyan sponsored terrorist group.  Two hundred people were injured, sixty-seven of 
them United States soldiers, and one United States soldier and one civilian died.71  On the 
basis of this information, President Reagan authorized a retaliatory strike against 
Qadhafi.  This was carried out by aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea and United 
States Air Force F-111’s launched from an airbase in the United Kingdom.  The 
Operation named EL DORADO CANYON was designed primarily to damage Libyan 
leader Muamaar Qadhafi’s terrorist functions operating from camps in Libya.  President 
Reagan justified the operation on the basis of the United States’ right of self-defense 
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.72  The operation encountered a serious 
obstacle when the French government refused over- flight authorization for the F-111’s, 
which added 1300 miles to the trip each way.    The United States was criticized by some 
for using such disproportionate force.  But the air strikes effectively silenced Qadhafi 
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who has been a muted presence in the region ever since.  Equally as important to the 
future of naval forward presence was the flexibility that CVBGs provided to military 
commanders when compared to land-based aircraft.  The aircraft carriers successfully 
conducted their strike missions without the need to gain diplomatic permission 
beforehand, proving their value as sovereign United States territory. 
E. BOSNIA/KOSOVO 
The flexibility of naval forward presence during the Bosnian and Kosovo 
conflicts, as against Gadhafi in 1981, was reinforced by the ability of the United States 
Navy to operate its aircraft from the sovereign territory of the aircraft carrier.  United 
States naval forces provided the flexibility that NATO Commanders needed to hit a target 
quickly.  Carrier based aircraft and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) missile 
launchers are well designed to accomplish this mission.  Prepositioning the aircraft 
carrier battle group and stealthy submarines near Yugoslavia enhanced the rapid reaction 
time of naval forces.  All of these factors reinforced the importance of naval forward 
presence and its ability to reinforce the NATO presence there.  Forward deploying carrier 
battle groups to the conflicts added significant firepower in the region.  Additionally, 
carriers provided important naval aircraft assets that operated independently of tenuous 
base agreements.73 
The humanitarian disaster that resulted from the break-up of Yugoslavia starting 
in 1991 highlighted the absence of effective European institutional mechanisms for 
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handling a crisis of this magnitude.  The European Community’s attempt to intervene was 
hindered by the inability of all members, notably Germany and France, to agree upon key 
objectives.  Additionally, they lacked the ability to insert a multinational/European 
military force capable of bringing the crisis under control.  NATO did have the necessary 
military muscle, but the United States’ leaders were unwilling to become involved in the 
resolution of what they saw as a European problem. 74  However, it gradually dawned on 
Washington that the United States had a lot at stake in the Balkans. 
The United States needed to regain the confidence of its allies and the brilliance 
as the leading military power of the alliance that it had won during the Persian Gulf War, 
but subsequently forfeited during the Somalia debacle.  The United States was also 
searching for common interests with its allies that could justify sending United States 
forces to Yugoslavia.  The introduction into Yugoslavia of United States forces was a 
gradual one.  Initially the Unites States took an active role in enforcing the weapons 
embargo promoted by the United Nations.  Later on, the United States came to view the 
prevention of NATO members Turkey and Greece from becoming embroiled in the 
Balkans conflict as a primary role of NATO’s senior partner.  But the most important 
reason for United States involvement was the leadership role that the United States still 
possessed within the NATO alliance and its recognition as the sole remaining superpower 
in the world. 
United States naval intervention began with Maritime Interdiction Operations 
(MIO) during July 1992, in support of the arms embargo authorized by United Nations 
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Security Resolution Number 713.75  The combined naval effort between the United 
States, NATO and Western European Union (WEU) allies significantly curbed the flow 
of arms to Bosnia via the Adriatic Sea.  Two separate operations known as Operation 
SHARP VIGILANCE for the WEU and Operation MARITIME MONITOR for NATO 
and the Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM) continued to operate for nearly 
four years.  When the operation later named Operation SHARP G UARD was ceased on 
18 June 1996, it had compiled roughly 74,000 ship challenges, with nearly 6,000 suspect 
ships inspected at sea and more than 1,400 being redirected to various ports for more 
thorough inspection. 76  Obviously, the advantages of naval forward presence were limited 
in this instance because NATO forces were unable to enforce embargoes on fuel, 
weapons or other shipments via overland routes. 
United States aircraft operating from NATO airbases in Europe participated by 
delivering aid to refugees, while aircraft flying from USS John F. Kennedy and USS 
Theodore Roosevelt flew support missions over Bosnia to enforce the no-fly zone.  
During July 1992, Joint Operation PROVIDE PROMISE began as a humanitarian relief 
effort for besieged cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.77  United States Navy and United States 
Air Force aircraft were tasked to provide airborne protection for these relief flights. 
Operation DENY FLIGHT was activated to enforce United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 816.  The primary purpose of DENY FLIGHT was to inhibit Serbian 
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aircraft that were supporting land battles over Bosnia.78  These Serbian fixed wing and 
helicopter missions played a significant role in the ground war and disrupted the delivery 
of aid to refugees.  Initially, the United States Navy carrier airwings were the only 
military units in the theatre with the capability to fly defensive and offensive air-cover 
missions for the United Nations directed aid flights that were air-dropping relief supplies.  
Therefore, Operation DENY FLIGHT was crafted so that United States naval aviation 
could enforce United Nations Security Resolution 816.79  The flexibility and rapid 
response provided by United States Navy carrier battle groups were essential to the 
success of the operation. 
United States naval aircraft were an effective force multiplier to NATO airpower 
in Bosnia and provided a deterrent that influenced the strategy of Serbian commanders.  
The sustained presence of an aircraft carrier in the Adriatic and NATO land-based 
aircraft flying from bases in Europe possessed the capability to strike targets far inland, 
thereby forcing the Serb Air Force to observe the no-fly zone.  Additionally, surface and 
subsurface naval units loaded with precision guided Tomahawk cruise missiles remained 
in the Adriatic.  Admiral Mike Boorda informed the Serbs that, “we knew where their 
weapons were and we told them we knew.”  The Serb Commanders had no choice but to 
remove their weapons from the United Nations designated safe areas, because otherwise 
they would be destroyed during future NATO air attacks.80 
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The event that finally led to NATO’s offensive air power involvement in Bosnia 
was the shelling of the Markela Marketplace on 5 November 1995.  According to Mark 
Danner:  
Sarajevo came under siege in April 1992 and continued to be shelled and 
sniped from the surrounding hills until the summer of 1995.  Many 
important National buildings had been demolished and thousands of 
people had been killed or wounded during two years of incessant artillery 
attacks, but no day brought more attention to Sarajevo from the 
international community than 5 February 1995.  When on this day a 
120mm artillery shell exploded on the Markela Marketplace and killed 69 
Sarajevans, the world finally took notice.81 
The brutal massacre of so many people in a public place enraged Western leaders and 
finally led to the demand that artillery be moved back from the hills above Sarajevo.  
Small-scale NATO aircraft bombing raids were used to enforce this demand. 
During the Kosovo conflict the United States’ Representative Richard Holbrooke 
led efforts to initiate the peace process at Rambouillet.  However, even after the Kosovar 
Albanians signed the agreement on 19 March 1999, Miloševic thumbed his nose at the 
deal.82  The arrogance displayed by Slobodan Miloševic proved that the United States 
and her European allies could not force him to sign an agreement without actually 
resorting to the use of force.  The NATO Commanders argued that the forthcoming 
bombing campaign would be quick and decisive.  Miloševic however, believed that he 
could survive an air campaign, because his military chiefs optimistically thought that the 
Russians would provide Serbia with sophisticated missile systems that could knock 
NATO aircraft from the skies.  However, when Operation ALLIED FORCE began on 24 
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March 1999, it became obvious that conflicting signals were being sent to Miloševic from 
Moscow.83  President Clinton added to Miloševic’s confidence that he could survive 
NATO pressure by insisting, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a 
war.”84  These public statements may have been aimed at reassuring the American public 
that there would be no repeat of Somalia.  However, they were also transparent policy 
statements that steeled Miloševic’s resolve to persist with ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. 
In President Clinton’s defense, his statement was undoubtedly made with the 
horrible vision in mind of what happened to United States troops in Mogadishu during 
the October 3, 1993 confrontation between United States Special Forces and Mohamed 
Farah Aideed’s militia.  During the unsuccessful attempt to capture Aideed, three United 
States Army Black Hawk helicopters were shot down, 18 Army Rangers were killed and 
78 more were wounded.  However, the most appalling vision brought home to American 
television viewers was the dead American helicopter pilot being dragged through the 
streets of Mogadishu as jeering crowds looked on. 85  This significant loss of life during a 
mission originally designed to help feed a starving nation forced the United States to 
rethink its position in Somalia and led to the withdrawal of United States troops there.  
Protecting the lives of Americans serving in future conflicts would now take precedence 
when determining how they would be employed.  As in Lebanon in 1983, the value of the 
objective was viewed as too low and when the enemy raised the price beyond what the 
United States was willing to suffer, it pulled its troops out. 
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The conflict in Kosovo presented many political difficulties for the United States 
and its NATO allies.  For one thing, everyone realized that it was impossible to get a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution passed regarding Kosovo over an inevitable 
Russian veto.  Ultimately, NATO decided to defend Kosovo on the grounds of moral 
duty and bypassed the often-used United Nations Security Council Regulation.  NATO 
Secretary-General Javier Solana emphasized what NATO saw as a moral imperative to 
take action. 
We have no quarrel with the people of Yugoslavia who for too long have 
been isolated in Europe because of the policies of their government.  Our 
actions are directed against the repressive policy of the Yugoslav 
leadership. We must stop violence and bring an end to the humanitarian 
catastrophe now taking place in Kosovo.  We have a moral duty to do 
so.86 
NATO Commander, General Wesley Clark used this moral argument to convince 
the lone holdout, France, that striking Miloševic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) 
headquarters was necessary because it was a viable military target.  Although bombing of 
the SPS headquarters may not have been militarily significant, everyone came to 
understand that the attack did ho ld a symbolic importance.  This was the beginning of 
NATO’s attack on the heart of Slobodan Miloševic’s political stronghold.87  However, 
Miloševic proved resilient, and it took until 3 June 1999 before he was ready to begin 
peace negotiations.  Armed with the knowledge that NATO was finalizing plans to begin 
a ground war and that the Russians would not come to his rescue, he capitulated.  When 
the Yugoslav leaders realized that there was no room for negotiation during the meetings 
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held in Blace, Macedonia, they signed the agreement.  NATO bombing was suspended on 
10 June 1999 as the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 which allowed the 
entry of NATO troops into Kosovo and guaranteed Yugoslav sovereignty.  Additionally, 
over 1,300,000 refugees displaced by ethnic cleansing were allowed to return to their 
homes and villages from Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and areas 
throughout Kosovo.88 
Throughout the conflict and following the suspension of bombing, the United 
States Navy and United States Marine Corps provided successful forward deployed 
support.  Carrier based aircraft flew nearly 3,100 of the total 35,000 allied sorties during 
Operation ALLIED FORCE.  Once the air campaign concluded, the USS Theodore 
Roosevelt remained on-station in the Adriatic Sea while NATO re-deployed its ground-
based aircraft in late June.89  Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh Burke Chair and Senior 
Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, lists four major reasons why 
Serbia was ultimately forced to concede: 
· The Damage done by NATO air and missile power and NATO’s 
continuing ability to attack any target with impunity, 
· The fact that Serbia alienated most of the world by its ethnic cleansing and 
lost all political support, 
· Serbia’s inability to defeat the ground operations of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army without exposing its forces to devastating air attack, and, 
· The growing prospect that NATO would pursue a ground option if NATO 
air and missile power did not achieve decisive results.90 
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Throughout Operation ALLIED FORCE, NATO’s ability to maintain air 
supremacy with little loss kept the price in NATO lives low because few were shot down.  
This signifies one of the air campaigns greatest successes.  Therefore, popular political 
support was maintained. 
However, the actual success of allied weapons and their proclaimed effect upon 
Serbian weapons was not as overwhelming as initial NATO claims reported, because of 
problems associated with climate, altitude restrictions and terrain.  There was at least 50 
percent cloud coverage 70 percent of the time in the operating area.  The 15,000-foot 
altitude restriction imposed for flight crew safety restricted the accuracy of precision-
guided weapons.91  The Serbs also proved to be very good at making decoys.  It was 
unrealistic to expect NATO pilots flying 15,000 feet overhead to be able to distinguish 
between what appears to be an artillery piece, but was actually a log configured and 
camouflaged to look like a gun.  This problem will likely be rectified in future conflicts 
by greater employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) by United States Navy, 
Army and Air Force units.  Less costly than actual aircraft and even more so politically 
when compared to the loss of a pilot, UAV’s can provide close-range reconnaissance and 
battle damage assessment for more effective weapons effectiveness assessments.92 
Finally, the stark contrast between the relatively flat sea of sand during the 
Persian Gulf War and the mountainous, forested areas of Kosovo amplified the difficulty 
experienced by United States and allied pilots.  Even though actual Serbian weapons did 
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not suffer all of the losses claimed by NATO, they were rendered impotent during the 
conflict because Serbian forces realized that allied capabilities existed to destroy them.  
Knowing that NATO counter-striking High-Speed Anti-Radiation (HARM) missiles 
could lock onto their missile system radars forced Serbian missile controllers to keep fire-
control radars on their SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 missile systems shut down and effectively 
made them useless. 
F. DRAWBACKS TO NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE IN LITTORAL 
REGIONS 
Despite the many advantages represented by naval forward presence, there are 
serious disadvantages as well.  The primary disadvantage to large carrier battle groups 
operating in the littoral environment is vulnerability.  The danger to CVBGs and ARGs is 
accentuated in regions like the Mediterranean Sea and other adjacent seas for at least four 
reasons: 
· The Mediterranean Sea is a Confined geographic environment highlighted 
by choke points.  You are never far from land, but operating here is a 
requirement because of the past and present conflicts occurring in the 
vicinity of the Sicilian Narrows near Libya, the Aegean Sea and the 
Adriatic Sea.  
· The Mediterranean is an unstable political environment with flash points 
in North Africa, the Balkans, Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean.  
Terrorist attacks are more easily accomplished when the target is operating 
in littoral waters near the terrorist’s base of operations, versus blue water 
operations. 
· Weapons development technology that allows wealthy nations as well as 
poorer ones and terrorists to possess missiles loaded with weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).  Even relatively low-level technological weapons like 
the explosive boat used against the USS Cole (which is a revival of the 
Italian “pigs” used against Malta, Alexandria, Souda Bay and Gibraltar 
during World War II) can be an extremely effective terrorist weapon. 
· Risk of incidents and mistakes by United States forward deployed forces 
is increased when operating within a heavily trafficked and politically 
volatile littoral environment. 
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The United States Navy must continue to develop weapons systems that exceed 
the technological advances of adversarial nations or it will become dangerously 
vulnerable to relatively inexpensive, yet potent weapons.  China, Russia, North Korea 
and Israel have the technological capability and economic need to sell surface-to-surface 
and surface-to-air missiles to less prosperous and rogue nations throughout the world.  
Technological advances compound this problem and are making it easier for nations to 
convert conventional missiles into weapons of mass destruction. 
The Mediterranean nations of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Serbia, Syria, and Tunisia 
all possess some form of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles.  They range from the Soviet made 
SS-N-2 Styx and AS- Kennel missiles to French Exocet’s and Chinese HY-2 Silkworms.  
These anti-ship missiles vary in effective ranges from 25 to 60 miles.93  When they are 
loaded onto ships or aircraft, there is nowhere in the Mediterranean that they cannot 
reach.  The anti-access capabilities embodied within anti-ship missiles make choke points 
at Gibraltar, the Sicilian Channel, the Aegean-Dardanelles-Bosporous and Suez Canal 
extremely dangerous for all shipping traffic.  Operating in confined littoral waters against 
missiles with very small radar cross sections that make many anti-ship cruise missiles 
difficult to detect reduces reaction time for U.S. Navy ships to launch defensive weapons 
or maneuver out of harm’s way. 94  Although some of the larger missiles may lack 
stealthy characteristics or sea skimming capabilities, they compensate for this with very 
fast closure speeds. 
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Another growing threat within the Mediterranean is the proliferation of ballistic 
missiles with ranges up to 2,700 miles.  Syria, and Libya have ballistic missiles that are 
produced in France, Israel, Russia, North Korea and China.95  Gaining the capability to 
mount WMD onto ballistic missiles greatly compounds the possible instability 
throughout Africa, Europe, and the Middle East.  Naval vessels transiting the 
Mediterranean would be at risk throughout the sea if coordinated efforts for targeting 
were employed by rogue nations.  The ability to purchase positional data from 
commercial satellite systems with high resolution imaging capabilities will assist rogue 
nations and terrorist groups with targeting Sixth Fleet ships operating in the 
Mediterranean. 96  The addition of enhanced targeting data for anti-ship cruise missiles 
imposes an ever- increasing danger to naval vessels as well as commercial traffic 
transiting through littoral waters. 
Proliferation of sea based mine warfare in the littoral environment can render 
technologically superior ships helpless.  Plus, mines rarely leave a return address and this 
amplifies the difficulty of directing retaliatory action.  There are three primary categories 
of mines in use today.  They are bottom mines, moored mines, and drifting mines.  
Although drifting mines were banned under the 1907 Hague Convention, they were still 
in use during the Persian Gulf War. The USS Princeton (CG 59) was the first cruiser to 
be fitted with the advanced SPY-1 AEGIS radar, but it suffered serious damage from a 
relatively inexpensive floating mine that was likely dumped off of an Iraqi vessel during 
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the Persian Gulf War.97  Bottom mines rest on the bottom in shallower areas where they 
can detonate by mechanisms that react to acoustic, magnetic or pressure changes near the 
mine.  Moored mines are tethered to a cable that anchors it to the bottom.  They float at 
predetermined depths and actuate after preprogrammed acoustic, magnetic or pressure 
sensors detect the correct target.98  Naval mines pose a serious threat to military and 
civilian shipping, because they can be easily deployed near choke points, common sea-
lanes, and harbor entrances. 
Terrorism is another subject that represents difficult challenges for forward 
deployed naval forces operating in littoral waters, during port calls or re-fueling 
stopovers.  The 12 October 2000 terrorist bombing of the USS Cole (DDG 67) in Aden, 
Yemen while it was making a refueling stop has escalated United States concerns 
regarding adequate anti-terrorism security procedures for all military units operating 
overseas.  The attack killed 17 United States sailors and wounded 39 more.  Damage 
figures on the USS Cole have been estimated at $240 million and are expected to take at 
least one year to fix.99  This highlights the fact that even a very sophisticated platform 
like the USS Cole is vulnerable to low-tech weapons that are available to virtually any 
group.  Additional incidents like this would put increased pressure upon the already 
thinly spread United States naval fleet. 
Although United States military personnel have been attacked before by terrorists 
in places such as Lebanon and the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the USS Cole incident 
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awakened everyone who thought it was impossible for a terrorist bomb to inflict damage 
on a Unites States naval vessel.  Reduction of the United States’ oiler fleet from 30 
during the Cold War to 21 today forces some ships to refuel in-port versus at-sea and this 
adds to the danger of operating in unfriendly territory. 100  It will take extreme measures 
to ensure that another incident like this does not occur while ships transit near the coast or 
when they enter/exit port facilities overseas.  Ultimately, the threat of terrorism is 
changing the way that the United States Navy operates. 
Finally, operating in heavily trafficked and politically volatile littoral 
environments increases the chance that mistakes will be made.  During the 1967 Six- Day 
War, Israel accidentally attacked the United States’ communication ship, Liberty, killing 
34 people.  The United States suspected that Egypt had carried out the attack, but Israel 
admitted its mistake in time to prevent a retaliatory strike upon Egypt by the United 
States.101  In these situations, the reaction time available for ships and their crews to react 
is greatly decreased.  Commanders are forced to make split second decisions based on 
information received from their own on-board sensors or from those of other ships and 
aircraft operating nearby. 
The USS Vincennes (CG 49) and its Commanding Officer, Captain Will Rogers 
III, became caught up in another event that seriously strained already tense relations 
between the United States and Iran.  Captain Rogers and his crew were engaged in an 
attack near the Strait of Hormuz against Iranian gunboats that had fired upon the 
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Vincennes’ helicopters as they followed the gunboats back toward their port.  Around the 
same time, an Iranian Airbus A300 took off from Bandar Abbas Airfield on a routine 
scheduled flight to Dubai, United Arab Emirates.  Captain Rogers and his crew 
mistakenly identified this commercial airliner as an Iranian F-14 fighter.  Combat 
Information Center personnel reported this to Captain Rogers and then reported that its 
AEGIS Radar showed an aircraft in a descent toward their position.  This information 
combined with an Iranian P-3 maritime patrol aircraft flying near the coastline and the 
memory of what had happened to USS Stark when she was attacked by two Iraqi Exocet 
missiles, convinced Captain Rogers that he was under attack.  Captain Rogers authorized 
an attack on his supposed assailant with surface-to-air missiles.  Only later did he learn 
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IV. CAPABILITIES AND MISSIONS OF UNITED STATES 




The CVBG developed in World War II and the ARG are both formidable 
weapons of war whose technical capabilities give the United States the ability to project 
power almost anywhere in the world.  However, in the post-Cold War world, the CVBG 
and ARG have had to try to adapt to new missions.  When crises occur, United States 
Naval Forward Presence offers a versatile support base to perform a variety of missions, 
among them: 
· Pilot Rescue 
· Reconnaissance 
· Tomahawk Missile Attacks 
· Amphibious Intervention 
· Armed Intervention  
A. TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE CARRIER BATTLE GROUP 
(CVBG) 
The battles fought in the Pacific during World War II helped to establish the 
aircraft carrier as the primary building block for United States battle groups.  Surrounded 
by a protective wall of cruisers, destroyers, frigates and submarine forces, aircraft carriers 
and their aircraft were able to project power toward an enemy over the horizon.  Over the 
years, this battle group concept has been improved with continually evolving 
technological advances to the carrier aircraft, surface ships and submarines.  Carrier 
battle groups have the flexibility to deploy from one theater of operations to another in a 
relatively short amount of time.  When necessary, this provides the President of the 
United States the ability to back up diplomacy with significant military muscle.  
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Additionally, this battle group comes complete with its own logistics supply lines and 
politically sovereign airfield.  The training carried out during pre-deployment exercises 
allows every ship of the battle group to practice for possible contingencies in their 
assigned theater of operations.  Arriving on station already trained for the area provides 
local commanders with instant firepower and support on demand. 
The typical aircraft carrier’s embarked carrier air wing (CVW) is comprised of F-
14, F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C and S-3 fixed wing aircraft.  In addition, various models of SH-
60 rotary wing aircraft complement this fighting fortress.  The battle group is normally 
comprised of a Nimitz or Kitty Hawk-class Aircraft Carrier, Ticonderoga-class Aegis 
equipped Cruisers, Arleigh Burke class Aegis Destroyers or Spruance-class non-Aegis 
capable Destroyers, Oliver Hazard Perry-class Guided Missile Frigates and Los Angeles-
class or Seawolf-class Attack Submarines. 
1.  Basic Functions of Naval Assets  
The F-14 Tomcat brings with it the capability to provide long range offensive and 
defensive air-to-air coverage for the carrier, precision strike capabilities when the Low-
Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) targeting system is 
installed and real-time/near real-time combat photoreconnaissance via the Tomcat 
Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod (TARPS).103 
Newer and more versatile F/A-18 Hornets are all-weather strike fighters capable 
of covering the offensive and defensive air-to-air role, striking land or shipping targets 
with precision-guided munitions, attacking enemy radar sites with anti-radiation missiles 
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or protecting ground forces with close air support.104  The F/A-18 Hornet is a step 
forward from earlier United States Navy fighter aircraft.  It possesses the ability to fight 
its way to an enemy target, drop laser guided precision ordnance onto that target and then 
fight its way out using long-range or short-range air-to-air weapons.  “On the first day of 
Operation Desert Storm, two F/A-18C’s, each carrying four 2,000 pound bombs, shot 
down two Iraqi MIG-21 interceptors, then proceeded to deliver their bombs on target.”105 
The aircraft carrier based EA-6B Prowler provides SEAD coverage of enemy 
radar sites, HARM employment, communication jamming and electronic surveillance 
capabilities for the United States Navy, United States Air Force and Joint and Combined 
Forces.  The Prowler’s importance gained high level attention following the shoot-down 
of an F-117 Stealth Fighter over Kosovo.  “After the shoot-down of an F-117 in 
Operation Allied Force, no military aircraft, including stealth aircraft, flew in the theater 
without a Prowler providing standoff jamming.  Operations Allied Force and 
Northern/Southern Watch marked the largest deployment of Prowlers in the entire history 
of the EA-6B program.”106 
The E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning aircraft is tasked with long range 
detection of enemy aircraft or surface ships, electronic surveillance, command and 
control of fighter and strike aircraft and Airborne Battlefield Command, Control Center 
(ABCCC) duties.  ABCCC is the newest mission for E-2C crews and it evolved during 
NATO’s extended role in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.  Operation Allied Force 
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was NATO’s response to Serbian aggression against Muslims living in Kosovo.  The air 
campaign responsible for halting the Serbian advances required an intricate network of 
modified C-130, E-2C and E-3 aircraft to integrate the varied missions flown by pilots 
from numerous NATO countries.  The C-130 and E-2C carried out ABCCC missions that 
were responsible for coordinating target assignments and holding locations prior to an E-
2C, E-3 AWACS or ground control station taking control of them for their assigned 
mission. 107  Properly employing an aircraft capable of controlling multiple mission areas 
is essentially a force multiplier to the CVBG and NATO Commanders.  Commander 
Wayne D. Sharer emphasized the added value that the E-2C Hawkeye’s sensor suite 
brought to the ABCCC mission: 
The crew of five on the E-2C’s executed all the administrative functions of 
the ABCC while providing tactical input and direction to aircraft as the 
situation dictated (as presented on its displays through on-board sensors, 
reported data and data links).  For Hawkeye crews, airborne warning and 
tactical control is a primary mission.  This easily added a new dimension 
to a standard ABCCC mission.  Essentially, we became a self contained 
Airborne Warning/Tactical Control-ABCCC platform.  On any particular 
mission, crews were responsible for as many as 40 aircraft at a time.108 
The S-3B Viking was previously tasked with anti-submarine warfare and anti-
surface warfare duties, but more recently has been converted to fulfill airborne refueling 
duties for aircraft assigned to the carrier’s airwing.  However, the S-3B still maintains 
surveillance capabilities and offensive firepower. The Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar 
can quickly build the sea surface picture so the CVBG Commander can visualize every 
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angle of the threat environment and make crucial decisions on Over-the Horizon-Targets 
(OTHT). 
Two helicopter variants, the SH-60F and HH-60H Seahawk are typically 
employed aboard the aircraft carrier. The SH-60F is responsible for conducting surface 
searches that can detect and classify surface ships and subsurface searches that can detect, 
classify, localize and attack submarines. Secondary missions include plane guard duties 
during flight operations, search and rescue, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), 
communications relay and medical evacuation. 
The shore based P-3C Orion has been a workhorse for over thirty years, fulfilling 
a variety of roles and missions.  The basic P-3C is tasked with maritime patrols in support 
of naval embargoes, anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare duties, while 
carrying weapons capable of attacking enemy targets in all three arenas.  An ongoing 
modernization program is providing enhanced capabilities in the littoral arena.  Improved 
acoustic equipment is designed to work in the littoral environment, making the P-3C 
more viable in the difficult mission of searching for submarines in areas of increased 
ambient noise and increasingly complex bottom topography.  Additionally, P-3C aircraft 
are integrated into the Anti-Surface Warfare role by providing OTHT Command, 
Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C4I) and offensive weapons to the littoral 
environment.  Maverick missile carrying P-3C’s were responsible for enforcing sanctions 
in the Adriatic Sea against the Former Yugoslavia Republic.109 
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The aircraft carrier functions as a sovereign floating airfield capable of quickly 
transporting and repositioning airwing assets that make up one arm of the CVBG’s power 
projection capabilities.  Additionally, they act as the CVBG flagship and possess highly 
effective organic mission planning capabilities.  Defense of the aircraft carrier comes in 
the form of airwing aircraft, NATO Seasparrow Missile System, Phalanx Close in 
Weapons System (CIWS).  However, aircraft carriers rely primarily on surface 
combatants ranging from Ticonderoga-class Aegis Cruisers, Spruance-class Destroyers 
and Arleigh Burke-class Destroyers to provide the umbrella of protection necessary for 
the aircraft carrier’s survival from enemy attack.  These ships use surface to air missiles, 
Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and torpedoes to fulfill this role.110  The majority of Oliver 
Hazard Perry-class frigates have been updated with anti-air warfare capabilities that 
complement their primary role as an anti-submarine warfare platform. 
 Ticonderoga-class Aegis guided-missile cruisers are capable of tracking aircraft, 
ships, and surface, sub-surface and air- launched missiles targeted at the CVBG.  Using 
long-range Standard surface-to-air missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 5- inch guns, 
CIWS and torpedoes, they can defeat these weapons and the platforms that carry them, 
thereby providing protection for the CVBG. 111  Installation of the Vertical Launch 
System (VLS) allowed Aegis cruisers to carry and successfully launch Tomahawk cruise 
missiles in conflicts ranging from Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf to 
Operation Allied Force in the Former Yugoslavia. 
                                                 
110 The United States Navy Fact File, “Destroyers - DD, DDG” 
[http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-dd.html]. 30 October 2000. 
111 “Facts and Figures,” Volume 42, Number 1, Sea Power: Almanac Issue, 2001, p.114. 
65 
 Spruance-class Destroyers and Arleigh Burke-class Destroyers provide a variety 
of formidable services to the CVBG.  Employing long-range Standard missiles, Harpoon 
anti-ship missiles, 5-inch guns, VLS launched Tomahawk cruise missiles and CIWS, both 
classes provide superior coverage to the carrier and surrounding ships.  Additionally, 
using onboard anti-submarine systems and SH-60B Seahawk helicopters they provide a 
venerable wall of protection from the ever increasing submarine threat in the littoral 
environment.112 
 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates have the primary role of detecting, localizing 
and if necessary destroying submarines near the CVBG.  Following the collapse of the 
Former Soviet Union, Anti-Submarine Warfare’s (ASW) role did not diminished in 
importance, but the scope of the effort decreased except in the Pacific Ocean.  However, 
numerous crises occurring within the littoral environment during the last decade have re-
emphasized the importance and difficulty of the ASW mission.  SH-60B helicopters 
provide the submarine search.  Additionally, a Maritime Interdiction Operations role has 
evolved in importance since the United Nation’s (UN) activated sanctions against Iraq 
following the Gulf War.113  From the Persian Gulf to the Adriatic Sea, frigates have been 
significantly involved with this potentially dangerous mission. 
Los Angeles and Seawolf-class attack submarines provide the capability to hunt 
mines, covertly gather intelligence from enemy coastlines, deliver special operation 
forces in platoon size groups, and protect the battle group from enemy submarines and 
surface ships.  Additionally, carrying Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles gives 
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submarines a precision strike capability.114  Attack submarines were responsible for 
launching Tomahawk missile strikes against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm and 
more recently during Operation Allied Force.  During Desert Storm, attack submarines 
were able to launch their Tomahawks from the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean with 
aim points designated hundreds of miles away in Iraq.  This capability earned the USS 
Albuquerque the nickname “sharp shooter” by providing 100 percent accuracy for 
Tomahawk missiles launched on targets within Kosovo.115  Mk48 torpedoes, Tomahawk 
cruise missiles, sensitive sonar systems and stealth technology make attack submarines an 
important ally to the CVBG and coalition partners. 
B. TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP 
(ARG) 
When the carrier battle group is accompanied by an Amphibious Ready Group, 
there will be an additional three surface ships, 29 fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft and 
2,200 Marines from the Expeditionary Unit on board.116  This provides commanders with 
an exceptionally powerful and flexible complement of Marines that can carry out a 
variety of missions. 
The primary fixed-wing aircraft employed by the ARG in the battlefield are the 
AV-8B Harrier, two seat version of the F/A-18 Hornet and the EA-6B Prowler.  The 
Hornet and Prowler are often deployed onboard an aircraft carrier or from land bases and 
the Harrier operates primarily from the big deck amphibious assault ships of the Tarawa-
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class LHA or Wasp-class LHD. 117  Marine Corps F/A-18s conduct forward air controller 
duties, collect tactical reconnaissance from the battlefield, carry out air strikes and 
provide close air support for Marines on the ground and carry many of the same weapons 
as the U.S. Navy versions.  The EA-6Bs perform the same mission as those of the U.S. 
Navy’s Prowlers.  Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) capabilities of the AV-
8B Harrier make it a venerable weapon platform, designated specifically to deploy 
aboard amphibious assault ships and support Marine Expeditionary Units, Special 
Operations Capable MEU(SOC).  Plus, it allows Harriers to be forward deployed onto the 
battlefield without needing to build an elaborate landing facility. 
Helicopters provide the U.S. Marine Corps MEU(SOC) with capable and reliable 
support throughout the inland battle space.  The AH-1 Super Cobra is a flying gunship 
responsible for providing forward fire support and close air support (CAS) for Marines 
on the ground, directing naval surface fire support missions, attacking enemy armored 
vehicles and helicopters and conducting armed reconnaissance missions of the forward 
battle area.118 
The UH-1 Huey helicopter is tasked with providing airborne command and 
control, armed escort, assault troop transportation, security and fire support for Marines 
on the ground and airborne forward air controller duties during CAS, mortar, artillery and 
Naval Surface Fire Support missions.119 
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The aging CH-46 Sea Knight and CH-53 Sea Stallion accomplish the primary 
battlefield troop transport and medium-lift requirements for Marine Corps weapons, 
equipment and supplies.120  However, as noted before, they provide the MEU(SOC) with 
the ability to conduct Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and/or Personnel (TRAP) missions in 
support of armed Combat Search and Rescue operations. 
The United States Navy and United States Marine Corps have a long-standing 
tradition of taking the fight to the enemy from the sea.  Future capabilities that will allow 
them to project power further inland will hinge upon future budgetary restraints and 
successful development and employment of weapons systems that make them a fighting 
force second to none.  The Post Cold War environment combined with American’s 
distaste for loss of life in foreign countries where they see no shared common enemy 
made it difficult for military leaders to convince Congress that increased military 
spending was necessary during the 1990’s.  However, President George W. Bush and his 
administration team appear to be on the brink of proposing radical changes toward this 
downward trend in military spending.  Even so, many Americans do not envision 
countries such as the Yugoslavia, Africa, China and Iraq as posing any direct threat to the 
United States in the near future.  Nevertheless, in today’s global economy, nearly all 
countries and their economies are interconnected and even small military crises can have 
an effect on the United States in some way.   
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C. MISSION ROLES FOR U.S. NAVAL FORCES FORWARD DEPLOYED 
TO THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
1. Pilot Rescue  
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and/or Personnel is a critical mission area that the 
United States Marine Corps successfully fulfilled during the Bosnia conflict.  After 
Captain Scott O’Grady’s F-16 was shot down over Bosnia during an Operation “DENY 
FLIGHT” mission, he was rescued by a heavily armed CH-53 helicopter assigned to a 
Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable MEU(SOC) conducting a 
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and/or Personnel mission. 121 
Support for this type of mission comes from many different units operating within 
and outside of a country’s borders.  Special SEAL units operating covertly within a 
country’s borders can locate a pilot and provide security in the area until TRAP personnel 
arrive.  Additionally, Naval and Marine Corps forces offshore have the ability to provide 
CAS and Air Supremacy for rescue units.  This support comes from a variety of fixed 
wing and rotary wing aircraft including the F-14 Tomcat, F/A-18 Hornet, AV-8B Harrier, 
AH-1 Super Cobra and UH-1 Huey. 
2. Reconnaissance 
Determining an enemy’s current and future order of battle is obtained by a variety 
of means.  Special satellites, aircraft, ships, submarines and human intelligence gathering 
techniques are employed to gather different types of vital information about the enemy. 
U.S. Navy SEAL teams operating in 16 man platoons can be deployed around the 
world by a variety of means.  Specially equipped submarines like the USS Kamehameha 
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(SSN 642) carry Seal Delivery Vehicles (SDV) that project SEAL teams onto hostile 
shores.122  These teams can be rapidly inserted into crisis areas and provide valuable 
human intelligence-gathering capabilities to collect tactical intelligence. 
The EP-3E and P-3C aircraft from specially equipped Reconnaissance Squadrons 
are capable of supplying electronic and visual surveillance of the battlefield.123  
Employing electronic systems capable of intercepting unencrypted voice transmissions, 
the EP-3E takes advantage of vital real-time communications that can be used to build a 
situational picture of events unfolding within a country’s borders.  The Navy outfitted 
two specially equipped P-3C’s with a long-range, electro-optical video camera system 
during the Bosnian and Kosovo campaigns, that allowed crews visually to monitor troop 
movements, arms storage areas, key bridges and other sites.  Crewmembers were then 
able to conduct near-real time analysis of the video and provide this information to 
theater commanders.124  However, a recent midair collision involving a U.S. EP-3E 
flying a reconnaissance mission and a Chinese F-8 along the Chinese coastline underlines 
the vulnerability of these types of missions. 
Finally, U.S. Naval surface combatants and submarines provide additional 
intelligence gathering capabilities.  Sensitive antenna arrays allow surface ships to gather 
radio frequency (RF) emissions and route them to shipboard operators that can analyze 
them for information.  Submarines use their stealth characteristics to gain access to 
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sheltered waters near enemy shorelines and covertly loiter within range to intercept 
transmitted RF signals and additional emissions from our adversary’s surface or sub-
surface naval vessels.  This ability to perform technical analysis or “hull teching” of 
underwater noises is vital during time of war.  Matching naval vessels to their specific 
underwater signature aids submarine sensor operators in determining whether a vessel is 
a friendly or an enemy one.  Additional intelligence about ships, port facilities and 
operating patterns of enemy ships is gained visually through a submarine’s periscope. 
3. Tomahawk Missile Attacks 
The United States Navy possesses the capability to launch long-range, extremely 
accurate missile strikes from most of its ships and submarines.  The Ticonderoga-class 
Aegis Cruisers, Spruance-class Destroyers and Arleigh Burke-class Destroyers as well as 
the Los Angeles-class, Seawolf-class and Virginia-class submarines all carry Tomahawk 
Land Attack Missiles.  Being able to launch TLAM’s from ships and submarines at 
distances up to 900 nautical miles from their target removes the risk of losing pilots and 
their aircraft due to damage from surface-to-air missiles or enemy aircraft.125  
Additionally, Tomahawk cruise missiles need not require overflight permission from 
neighboring countries to cross their territory and alert the target.  On the other hand, 
failure to gain diplomatic approval from neighboring countries for Tomahawk flights 
may elicit diplomatic protests. 
In 1998, President Clinton authorized TLAM strikes from U.S. Navy ships 
operating in the Red and Arabian Seas against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in 
retaliation for attacks carried out upon U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.  
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U.S. officials say the six sites attacked in Afghanistan were part of a 
network of terrorist compounds near the Pakistani border that housed 
supporters of Osama bin Laden.  In the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, the El 
Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries factory – which U.S. officials say also has 
ties to bin Laden and produces chemicals that can be used to make deadly 
VX nerve gas –was heavily damaged.126 
The Tomahawk cruise missile provides the National Command Authority and 
Theater Commanders with a highly accurate weapon that sends a strong message to 
terrorists and adversarial leaders.  This message clearly informs leaders that the United 
States and her allies have the capability accurately and quickly to conduct preemptive or 
retaliatory strikes from nearly every ocean or sea around the world. 
Of course, the effectiveness of these missile attacks relies on accurate intelligence 
information.  One potential disadvantage of these stand-off strikes is that they allow 
targeted countries to claim that the targets were misidentified or that the strikes resulted 
in civilian deaths and other collateral damage.127 
4. Amphibious Intervention 
The United States Marine Corps provides an extremely flexible and adaptable 
force that has proven to be very effective during recent conflicts in the Mediterranean 
Region.  Tasking for Amphibious Ready Groups has grown rapidly over the last ten 
years.  The United States Marine Corps’ ability to provide deterrence and limited power 
projection has led to its involvement with Amphibious landings, Peacekeeping 
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Operations, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Humanitarian/Civic Assistance 
Operations, and Maritime Interdiction Operations.128 
The Marine Corps MEU(SOC) arrives in the theater of operations ready to 
conduct a variety of vital missions via ships of the United States Navy.  MEU(SOC)’s 
deploy with enough supplies for 15 days of operations.  The addition of a single maritime 
pre-positioning ship significantly increases the ability to stay in theater longer and even 
enlarge the forward deployed force.129  Typically, three ships make up the Amphibious 
Ready Group that deliver the Marines and provide logistical support.  These ARGs will 
consist of one Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA or LHD), one Amphibious Transport 
Dock ship (LPD) and one Dock Landing Ship (LSD) in each of the twelve Amphibious 
Ready Groups.  They are capable of successfully handling the Marine Corps’ future 
forward presence requirements.130 
Amphibious forces have also increased their inherent ability to successfully carry 
out Humanitarian Assistance/Civic Assistance roles.  The government of Bangladesh 
requested assistance following the devastation caused by a tropical cyclone in 1991.  A 
twenty-foot high wall of water swept across the coast of Bangladesh and up to three miles 
inland.  Upwards of 140,000 deaths and 1.7 million homeless were attributed to this 
tragedy.  Advance support members from the III Marine Expeditionary Force arrived 
within 24 hours of the request for help.  A fifteen-ship amphibious task force comprised 
of Amphibious Group 3 and the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade followed these liaison 
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personnel.  United States Marine Corps, Navy, Army and Air Force personnel meshed 
with multinational forces to provide food, water and medical assistance to nearly two 
million people.131  This type of operation may require the U.S. Marines to provide 
security personnel for food shipments and to prevent civil unrest.  But their primary 
concern is to assist with the distribution of food, supplies and medical assistance.  
Helicopters, personnel carriers, trucks and landing craft, air cushion (LCAC)’s give the 
U.S. Marines a great deal of flexibility, once ashore, to support a variety of missions. 
Peacekeeping is another vital mission that United States Marine Corps 
amphibious forces have successfully supported around the world.  However, 
peacekeeping requires exceptional military, logistical and political skills from the 
intervention force to know the proper mixture of force and persuasion to be applied. 
When refugees return home they are unlikely to be happy with their situation and there 
may be skirmishes.  Tempers may flare as one group seeks revenge for violence done to 
it by its ethnic rival.  But proper training can help to ensure that situations do not get out 
of hand.  The 24th MEU(SOC) continually met the challenge of new roles during the 
Kosovo campaign.  One of these new missions provided a reinforced company ashore in 
Albania to provide security to the Shining Hope refugee camp.  Major Timothy E. 
Winand had this to say about the Marines of Landing Team 3/8, who served in Kosovo 
from June–July 1999, in his January 2000 Marine Corps Gazette article, “The Marines 
never surrendered the initiative to any member of the population, nor did they give the 
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impression to anyone, suspected criminal or upstanding citizen, that we were anything 
less than completely in charge of all situations.”132 
5. Armed Intervention 
Conducting armed intervention in the Mediterranean Sea is not a new concept for 
the United States Navy.  However, there are major differences today that enhance the 
efficiency of U.S. Naval assets for this mission.  The U.S. Navy can reposition itself 
much faster than in the past.  Information exchange is so fast that decision-making can 
occur via video teleconferencing while commanders are actually operating in theater.  
The methods for delivering precision-guided weapons to a target have reduced collateral 
damage and increased the efficiency of those weapons.  Although, faulty targeting 
information provided by human based intelligence sources can cause serious damage to 
diplomatic relations.  For instance, faulty intelligence caused precision-guided weapons 
to be targeted against the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo conflict.  This 
example proves that no matter how accurate your weapons are, mistakes can happen 
unless your information is equally accurate. 
More recently, the United States Navy combined forces with NATO allies to stop 
the atrocities being committed by Serbian armed forces against Kosovar Muslims.    
Ethnic cleansing directed by Serbian leader Slobodan Miloševic forced hundreds of 
thousands of Kosovar Muslims to flee to Macedonia and Albania.  This in turn put a 
tremendous burden upon the governments of these countries. 
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The United States and our NATO allies threatened to take military action if 
Miloševic did not stop the ethnic cleansing.  When it became obvious that Miloševic 
would not back down without the actual use of force, the air campaign began.  The 
Kosovo air campaign, launched on 24 March 1999, opened with a heavy United States 
Navy cruise missile barrage aimed at degrading Serbian early warning radars and 
integrated air defenses.133  The CVBG has very robust capabilities that can have a 
significant impact on the outcome of this type of armed intervention.  Unfortunately, 
there were no aircraft carriers available for the first fourteen days of the Kosovo air 
campaign.  When the USS Theodore Roosevelt and her battle group finally arrived, her 
airwing was handed immediate tasking.  The versatility of Naval aviators to carry out 
missions without any time to acclimate to the new theatre of operations is an additional 
force multiplier to military commanders.  Even though the USS Roosevelt and her air 
wing arrived two weeks after the beginning of the air campaign, naval air forces were 
credited with 30 percent of the validated kills against Serbian weapons of war used in 
Kosovo.  This statistic is even more impressive when one considers that United States 
naval aircraft only accounted for 8 percent of the total dedicated aircraft deployed by 
NATO.134 
Throughout the Bosnian and Kosovo campaigns, United States naval forces 
proved their worth by continually rising to meet new challenges.  A classic example of 
this occurred during the Kosovo air campaign.  The carrier airwing and Tomahawk cruise 
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missiles were the  only two systems that possessed the capability to plan a strike during 
the morning and strike the target later the same day.  Podgorica airfield serves as a great 
example of the Navy’s ability to react quickly.  The United States Army’s Task Force 
Hawk was preparing to enter Albania and the proximity of Podgorica airfield posed a 
danger to them.  Additionally, the Serbs were moving significant ground attack aircraft 
into this airfield and storing them in an underground tunnel complex. 135  The following 
exchange took place between General Clark, General Short and Vice Admiral Murphy: 
When we detected that move, General Clark that morning said, ‘I have to 
have that airfield taken out now. We cannot afford a strike, against Task 
Force Hawk just across the border.’  He turned to General Short and said, 
‘Can you do it?’ and General Short said, ‘The Navy can do it.’  This was 
on a video teleconference.  He [Clark] turned to me and said, ‘Dan, can 
you do it?’ and I said, ‘Yeah, we can do it.’…  We put 48 airplanes in the 
air that afternoon and took out the entire airfield, including the 
underground tunnel complex that had 26 airplanes in it, and we emulsified 
every one of them, and [our crews] were home for dinner aboard the 
carrier.136 
Surface ships and submarines were equally effective when receiving short notice 
Tomahawk tasking orders.  The Serb forces used the nighttime to move their surface to 
air (SA-3) missile batteries around the country.  The electronic intelligence gathering 
aircraft used electronic intelligence hits to find these SA-3 sites and then directed U-2 
reconnaissance aircraft to the areas.  When the U-2 verified that the area contained an 
SA-3 site, they would relay these coordinates to a Tomahawk missile shooter onboard 
one of the United States ships or submarines.  Within forty-five minutes, a Tomahawk 
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missile would be on its way to the target.  The Tomahawk kill rate was 85 percent for 
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V. THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORWARD 
PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
 
 
A. CONTINUED VOLATILITY 
NATO expansion and EU enlargement are promoting a more democratic presence 
and a stabilizing influence in the Mediterranean.  Nevertheless, the restrictive EU 
political perspective, its complex decision-making process that must take account of the 
interests of many nations, and the operational limitations of its forces place constraints on 
its abilities to act as anything more than a secondary stabilizing force in the region.  
Therefore, continued volatility in the Mediterranean combined with persistent vital U.S. 
interests there will require United States Naval Forward Presence for the foreseeable 
future.  Fortunately for the United States, the capabilities of CVBG’s are steadily 
improving, and are more than adequate to deal with Mediterranean crises within the 
political limitations imposed by the mission.  Although CVBGs sometimes allow a gap in 
presence to exist when crises are not imminent, the ARG typically stays in the 
Mediterranean and can act as a stopgap to handle crises until the battle group can arrive.  
This chapter will review the actual, latent and potential crises in the Mediterranean, and 
then turn to the capabilities of CVBGs and ARGs to deal with those crises 
1. Middle East 
Since the beginning of Ariel Sharon’s time as Israel’s prime minister, the level of 
violence between Israelis and Palestinians has escalated and become practically 
permanent.  Even before he assumed his new office, Sharon’s visit to the disputed 
Temple Mount on 28 September 2000 ignited the latest cycle of violence that at the time 
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of writing, has so far resulted in 469 Palestinian and 84 Israeli deaths.138  The offensive 
actions carried out by one group serve only to invite quick and bloody retaliation by the 
other. 
The Arab League has demanded that its members sever all ties with Israel, but 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek and Jordan’s King Abdullah have been active in 
trying to get Israeli and Palestinian leaders back to peace talks so that a resolution can be 
enacted to stop the violence.  However, Israel recently escalated the violence on 18 May 
2001 when they used warplanes to strike Palestinian targets for the first time since the 
1967 Mideast War.139  In the past, United States efforts to bring the two sides together 
for peace talks has met limited success.  But finding a lasting agreement that both sides 
believe equitable has proven to be elusive.  So far, President George W. Bush’s 
administration has been reluctant to bring U.S. influence to bear on the conflict.  But this 
may change in the near future because of President Mubarek’s and King Abdullah’s call 
for American assistance.  Although naval forces deployed to the region may in the future 
be used to enforce some kind of agreement between the two sides, it is more likely that 
they would become involved in some type of non-combat evacuation operation or to 
support a multilateral peacekeeping force. 
2. North Africa/Libya 
Since the 1986 air strikes against Muamaar Qadhafi’s terrorist training camps by 
American aircraft, Libyan inspired and supported terrorism appears to have been quelled.  
The one notable exception however was the December 1988 bomb that blew up Pan Am 
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Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.  Libyans involved with the terrorist disaster were 
indicted by the United States and finally handed over by Qadhafi nearly ten years later, in 
return for the lifting of UN sanctions against Libya.140  In November 1999 a shipment of 
SCUD missile spare parts was intercepted at London's Gatwick airport.  The illegal 
payload was discovered on a flight bound for Tripoli via Malta on November 24, and 
reportedly included 32 crates of Scud missile components like those used by Iraq during 
the Gulf War.141  Qadhafi has denied that the missile parts were destined for him.  But his 
desire to gain improved ballistic missile systems is strongly suspected by the United 
States Central Intelligence Agency.  The possession by Qadhafi’s rogue regime of an 
updated missile system would have significant implications for the  security of North 
Africa and the Central Mediterranean.  While it is unlikely that a ballistic missile would 
be able directly to strike a vessel in the Mediterranean, this might not matter if the missile 
were loaded with WMD material.  It is quite possible that United States forward deployed 
naval forces could be called upon to strike at Libya’s underground chemical weapons 
making facility at Tarhunah, 60 kilometers southeast of Tripoli, if there is the possibility 
that Qadhafi may mount WMD material on his SCUD missiles.142 
3. Aegean 
The Aegean region remains vitally important today as NATO reaches eastward 
toward the former Warsaw Pact nations.  The Turkish Straits provide access to these 
countries and others surrounding the Black Sea.  Maintaining peace and security there is 
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a requirement for military-to-military partnerships with countries like Ukraine and NATO 
interoperability exercises with Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania.  Potential 
problems there include Turkish security, ongoing conflicts between Greece and Turkey, 
and the possibility of the spread of a Balkans war into the region. 
Turkish instability and security problems revolve around relations with the PKK, 
a Kurdish nationalist group that began a campaign of terror against the Turkish 
government in 1984.  The internal security problem has complicated traditionally difficult 
relations between Greece and Turkey, as Greece was recently discovered to have been 
facilitating the movements of one of the PKK’s leaders, Abdullah Ocalan.  Ankara’s 
struggle against the PKK has also raised doubts in the minds of EU leaders about 
Turkey’s suitability for Community membership in the near future.  Additionally, the 
PKK problem has raised the possibility that Cyprus could be admitted to the EU before 
Turkey.  Turkey points out that the international agreements that created Cyprus in the 
first place would be violated if Cyprus were allowed to join before Turkey. 143  Turkey 
sees itself as worthy of entry into the EU because it is a European country and because of 
its long-term NATO membership.  It regards objections based on the PKK and the 
Cyprus issues as red-herrings raised by its traditional Greek rival. 
Militarily, Turkey possesses a numerical advantage in terms of troops, compared 
to Greece.  But Turkey also shares borders with Iraq, Syria and Kazakhstan, giving it the 
distinction of bordering on some of the most unstable territory in the Middle East.  
According to Duygu Bazoglu Seza, “The eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf 
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form a single entity with Turkey and Egypt providing a continental and maritime bridge 
between Europe and the Middle East.”144  Keeping Turkey engaged via its NATO ties 
could prove beneficial to boosting their self-esteem and get them re-focused upon their 
ultimate goal of EU acceptance.  United States Naval forces will continue to play an 
important role in the Aegean region, because the tensions between Greece and Turkey are 
too easily inflamed and often require outside intervention to squelch them. 
4. Balkans  
The situation in the Balkans remains volatile.  Slobodan Miloševic appeared 
defiant and intent on regaining control of the Serbian parliament during the recent 23 
December 2000 elections.  Even after the October 5 revolution that led to his removal 
from power after an overwhelming electoral loss to Vojislav Kostunica, Miloševic called 
the new leaders “traitors” and referred to himself as a “national hero.”145 The situation in 
Yugoslavia, as in the Balkan Region generally, remains unstable. 
Macedonia, the entry point in the Balkans for United States ground troops during 
the Bosnian conflict, is now in turmoil as the result of the outcome of the Kosovo 
conflict.  Albanians make up roughly 30 percent and Slavs comprise around 70 percent of 
the roughly 1.8 million Macedonians.146  Albanian rebels who seek to create a “Greater 
Albania” are fighting against the relatively ineffective Macedonian Army.  The rebel’s 
attacks have led to Macedonian retaliation against Albanian villages to ferret out the 
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insurgents.  As a result, 16,000 ethnic Albanian have fled to Kosovo.147  Ironically, 
Macedonia became a haven for Kosovar Albanians during Slobodan Miloševic’s ethnic 
cleansing of Kosovo in 1999.  But this refugee influx placed pressure on the Macedonian 
state and helped to enflame ethnic tensions there.  Although the numbers of ethnic 
Albanian refugees fleeing Macedonia has so far not been too large, they could grow if the 
situation continues and the conflict spreads.  Meanwhile, the coalition of NATO 
peacekeepers remains on Kosovo’s borders to prevent Kosovar Albanian rebels from 
crossing the border to incite insurgency in Macedonia.  The importance of having United 
States Naval Forward Presence near the area has not been seen as essential.  But naval 
forces could be called upon during a short notice strike mission if it was deemed 
necessary to punish offenders of the peace treaty between Kosovo and Serbia. 
B. FUTURE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
“Maritime Dominance is the naval capability that dominates the seaward 
extension of the littoral to provide joint and combined forces unimpeded access to areas 
of interest.”148  This is the future for the United States Navy and requires five 
fundamental elements to succeed: anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, surface warfare, 
amphibious warfare and combat logistics.149  There will be a variety of new and 
improved weapon systems coming online in the near future that will provide land attack 
capabilities to naval surface ships.  These weapons will allow naval forces to raise the 
price of aggression; provide distant firepower to engage the enemy sooner over longer 
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distances; enable massed concentration of fire without massing forces; and limit United 
States loss of life and collateral damage.150 
Strategic choke points located throughout the Mediterranean Sea make it a 
potentially risky operating area during time of war.  By using anti-access techniques near 
the entrances to the most critical transit points such as the Strait of Gibraltar, Strait of 
Sicily, Strait of Messina, Turkish Straits or the Suez Canal, naval vessels would be 
prevented from entering or exiting the Mediterranean Sea via the Atlantic Ocean or Black 
and Red Seas.151  The weapons that can be used to prevent access to critical 
Mediterranean regions range from sophisticated sea-skimming anti-ship missiles to old 
technology contact mines.  Anti-access techniques would have profound effects upon the 
United States and NATO’s ability to enter the Mediterranean and provide support during 
regional crises.  Additionally, the inability to deliver vital oil supplies routed from the 
Persian Gulf through the Suez Canal or Caspian Sea crude delivered by way of the 
Turkish Straits or the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan overland route would cause economic and 
political instability within Europe, Eastern Asia and the Middle East.  The inability to 
receive necessary logistical supplies would put many ships at risk of attack from the 
countries controlling the entry/exit points to the Mediterranean and effectively tally them 
as a soft-kill, because they would be unable to participate in any crisis.  Nevertheless, 
improvements in both offensive and defensive capabilities of United States Navy ships 
should allow the United States to continue to project naval power into the Mediterranean 
Region. 
                                                 
150 Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Warfare Division (N76), “Maritime Dominance.” 
151 Lewis, Jesse, Jr., The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, Foreign Affairs Study 29, American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1976, p.8. 
86 
1. Offensive Capabilities of United States Naval Forward Presence 
Maintaining United States Naval Forward Presence in the Mediterranean will help 
to prevent aggressor nations from utilizing anti-ship missiles against military or civilian 
shipping. 152  Additionally, maintaining a forward presence in the region will show that 
the United States is interested in the region and cause rogue nations to realize that 
retaliatory strikes against them will make the cost of terrorism and aggression too high.  
Even so, the United States must continue to design and utilize new and improved 
offensive and defensive techniques to protect vital SLOCs. 
United States surface naval forces combined with the carrier airwing, amphibious 
ready group and submarines will use four new weapons to influence and intimidate 
aggressors within the Mediterranean.  These new or improved weapons are the extended 
range Tomahawk cruise missiles, Extended Range Guided Munitions, Advanced Gun 
System, and Land Attack Standard Missiles.  Most Aegis Cruisers and Aegis Destroyers 
will be retrofitted with these capabilities.  However, the new DD-21, 21st Century Land 
Attack destroyer is the designated platform for these weapons.153  The Tomahawk cruise 
missile will introduce new technology that increases tactical responsiveness out to ranges 
of 1600 nautical miles.154  New and improved Long-range Tomahawk’s with exceptional 
accuracy will allow the fleet to progressively fight its way into a region that may be 
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temporarily closed-off by aggressor nations.  The Extended Range Guided Munitions will 
use a rocket motor and modified five-inch gun to increase the current range of naval 
surface fire support from 13 nautical miles out to 63 nautical miles.155  Incorporating the 
Advanced Gun System onto DD-21 will extend on-call fire support out to 100 nautical 
miles with the combined accuracy of Global Positioning System and Inertial Navigation 
System.156  This will provide a naval surface fire support capability with superior 
accuracy and redundant guidance systems to prevent collateral damage and friendly fire 
incidents.  Finally, the Land Attack Standard Missile takes advantage of current 
technology embodied in the Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) and incorporates it into a 150 
nautical mile surface to ground weapon with precision strike capability.157  The last three 
weapon systems will be primarily used to support troops already onshore.  But they can 
also be used to help destroy short-range surface-to-surface missile sites placed near 
crucial sea- lanes, once United States naval vessels have entered the area. 
The United States Navy’s ability to attack the enemy from below the sea will be 
enhanced by the introduction of Virginia-class submarines scheduled to join the fleet in 
2004, and by Los Angeles and Sea Wolf submarines already in the fleet.  The Virginia-
class submarine will provide enhanced Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities in both deep 
water and littoral settings.  Various configurations will enable use of the Advanced SEAL 
Delivery System.  Additionally, re-configuring the torpedo room will allow increased 
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equipment and personnel storage spaces for SEAL teams.158  New submarines and re-
configured older models will be able to deploy new Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) 
technologies that are necessary to operate more safely in the littoral environment.  This 
technology incorporated into the New Attack Submarine (NSSN) will allow submarines 
to deploy UUV’s that can perform covert surveillance and intelligence collection and 
mine reconnaissance missions.159  The need to create battle space dominance within a 
theater of operations is imperative to the safe and successful operation of the submarine 
force, CVBG and the ARG.  A wide array of weapons will allow the NSSN to prepare the 
theater for this to occur.  Employing stealth technology, advanced Tomahawk Land-
Attack Missiles, Harpoon Anti-Ship Missiles, MK-48 Advanced Capability torpedoes, 
Special Operations Forces delivery and mine laying capabilities, the NSSN will help 
make the littoral environment a little less hostile to forward naval forces.160 
Conditions beneath the surface of the Mediterranean Sea compound the inherent 
difficulties often experienced during anti-submarine warfare operations within a littoral 
environment.  The presence of extreme thermal layering, varying bottom contours, 
underwater plateaus and sharply pitched seamounts make the Mediterranean Sea an ideal 
location for submarines to operate and hide.  Naval vessels tasked with locating 
submarines will experience extremely difficult seawater characteristics for operating the 
active and passive sonar systems that comprise the majority of anti-submarine warfare 
equipment.  The distortion caused by irregular bottom contours, high salinity content and 
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sun-heated layers that extend over 150 feet below the surface during the summer months, 
create a veritable submarine sanctuary that allow stealthy nuclear and advanced diesel-
electric submarines to go undetected.161  The addition of considerable ambient noise 
caused by commercial shipping traffic compounds the problem further. 
The ARGs future success in carrying out offensive operations hinges upon 
deployment of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) and MV-22B Osprey 
tilt-rotor aircraft.  “The MV-22B, the AAAV and the LCAC (landing craft, air cushion), 
will form the mobility triad that will enable the Marine Corps to implement its 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) war fighting doctrine.162  The Marine 
Corps has leveraged its future success upon the eventual deployment of the V-22B 
Osprey, because they would be able to move troops and equipment ashore from extended 
ranges at almost double the speed of current helicopters. Unfortunately, decisions on the 
V-22B Osprey have been postponed pending an investigation into recent mishaps 
involving loss of life.  The AAAV will provide amphibious Marine forces with an 
extremely capable all-around system that can deliver forces ashore and then be used 
onshore to carry out its assigned mission.  Its unique features include: 
1) an inherent amphibious capability; 2) a top speed, at a minimum, three 
times that of the AAV7A1; 3) nearly twice the armor protection of the 
AAV7A1 without appliqué armor; 4) the ability to defeat future-threat 
light armor vehicles frontally at ranges of at least 1,500 meters while on 
the move and under conditions of darkness and adverse weather; 5) 
significantly greater cross country mobility and speed than the current 
AAV7A1, permitting operations with the main battle tank (M1A1); 6) 
two-to-three times the carrying capacity of comparable existing personnel 
carriers, such as the Bradley fighting vehicle and the light armored vehicle 
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(LAV); and 7) the only embarked-infantry overpressure NBC collective-
protective system for a combat vehicle in the U.S. inventory. 163 
2. Defensive Capabilities of United States Naval Forward Presence 
Although offensive firepower will be important in defeating anti-access weapons, 
it is unrealistic to think that all weapons can be destroyed on the ground.  Therefore, it is 
imperative that United States naval forces forward deployed to the Mediterranean possess 
the most advanced defensive weapon systems available.  Network Centric Warfare 
systems will tie a variety of sensors into one commonly shared grid of offensive and 
defensive firepower.  “Cooperative Engagement will allow large numbers of CEC-
equipped surface ships and aircraft to operate as a single distributed air-defense system 
capable of passing fire-control-quality radar target measurements in real time to all ship 
and air units of the force.”164  Essentially, this means that an E-2C Hawkeye using its 
own long-range surface/air radar could provide targeting data to an AEGIS equipped 
cruiser or destroyer and enable that ship to fire long-range surface-to-air missiles upon an 
inbound missile and destroy it before its own radar system even detects it.  Combining 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) with sensors from the sea, air, land and space 
into a Navy Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) will make the U.S. Navy capable 
of intercepting ballistic missiles as they descend and long before they appear over their 
intended targets.165  Additionally, employing these defensive weapons within 
international waters will preclude the necessity of wrangling over political and home 
country approval.  In this way, the Aegis platform becomes a United States sovereign tool 
                                                 
163 “Facts and Figures,” Volume 42, Number 1, Sea Power: Almanac Issue, 2001, p.192. 
164 “Facts and Figures,” p. 153. 
165 “Facts and Figures,” p.156. 
91 
for defense against weapons of mass destruction that has the geographical flexibility of a 
CVBG. 
The flexibility of United States naval vessels provides an added dimension to 
avoiding enemy attack.  Because the CVBG can change locations at any time when 
operating in littoral areas, it decreases the vulnerability to anti-ship and ballistic missile 
attacks in a way that shore based military components cannot.  However, as anti-ship 
missiles become more advanced and less expensive, it is becoming very important to find 
additional ways of detecting and engaging missiles at longer ranges.  Supersonic cruise 
missiles intercepted and destroyed by close in weapons systems will create high-speed 
missile fragments that can still do damage to the defending ship and personnel. 166  One 
possible defense is to use “Street Fighter” techniques that combine the associated sensors 
of multiple ships, much like that of cooperative engagement, by using smaller ships 
carrying networked anti-submarine, anti-ship and anti-air weapons systems.167  This 
configuration would allow littoral seas to be sanitized of submarines and mines before the 
main battle group arrives.  After completing this task, the ships would remain to provide 
high-speed forward deployed air/surface missile defense along the expected threat axis.  
However, the drawbacks to this scenario are that these ships would need some type of 
mother ship to meld the information into a usable picture and provide refueling 
capabilities because of the relatively short endurance capability of the smaller ships.  
“Swarm tactics” would also prove important to preventing future suicide missions by 
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terrorist groups using small boats to deliver lethal amounts of explosives to ships 
operating in near- land littoral areas.168 
Future mine-countermeasure (MCM) capabilities will become more important in 
littoral campaigns and require covert manned and unmanned searches for floating, bottom 
moored or buried mines that heighten the danger of operating within the littoral 
environment and to amphibious landings.  In future mine warfare the U.S. Navy will 
integrate MCM sys tems from a variety of platforms.  These include the CH-60S 
Knighthawk helicopter, Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class DDG’s, Avenger-class Mine 
Countermeasure Ships (MCM), Osprey-class Coastal Minehunters (MHC), and Los 
Angeles, Seawolf and Virginia-class submarines operating mine hunting UUVs.  The 
most revolutionary MCM systems will be deployed within the next decade.  “The CH-60 
will be fitted with the AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine-Detection System (ALMDS), the 
Rapid Airborne Mine-Clearance System (RAMICS), an AQS-20X Sonar, an Airborne 
Mine-Neutralization System (AMNS), and the organic airborne and surface influence 
sweep (OASIS).”169  Additionally, Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class DDG’s will carry and 
deploy the WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System.  This semi-submersib le minehunting 
system operates via remote control and possesses the means to detect, localize and 
identify mines, so that one or more of the mine neutralization systems can be employed 
against it.170 
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE 
MEDITERRANEAN TO THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
The Mediterranean is a complex geographic, political and operational 
environment.  Geographically, the sea must be seen not merely as a lake, but as a 
maritime passage that links the Atlantic, Southern and Southeastern Europe, North 
Africa, Central Asia, the Near and Middle East, and the Indian Ocean.  It forms an 
important sea- lane of communication in both a commercial and a political sense.  
Commercially, much of the world’s commerce, and many of its raw materials, are 
extracted from or flow through the Mediterranean and its tributaries.  Politically, it offers 
one way, through forward naval presence that the United States can contact and support 
its allies, and punish its enemies, in the region.  Therefore, it is vital to U.S. interests, as 
well as to those of the Western democracies and our allies, that this SLOC remains free 
of impediment. 
Politically, the greater Mediterranean remains a region of extreme volatility.  The 
Balkans and Southeastern Europe, North Africa, the Aegean, Central Asia, and the 
Middle East are all places where the United States has an interest in maintaining stability, 
fostering commerce, and deterring terrorism and war.  United States Naval Forward 
Presence is one of our most effective and efficient ways to project our power and defend 
our interests there.  One reason for this is that the U.S. Navy, through its CVBGs and 
ARGs, as well as other complex weapons systems, provides the flexibility and array of 
operational possibilities best adapted to this geographically and politically complex 
region. 
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The benefits of maintaining United States Naval Forward Presence in the 
Mediterranean Sea have been etched in historical precedence for over 200 years.  
Throughout the years, United States Naval Forward Presence has proven its importance 
in support of U.S. political objectives in the region for at least six reasons: 
· It deters potential troublemakers.  
· It reassures our allies that we are committed to the region.  
· It prevents our allies from overreacting to situations. 
· It gives diplomatic solutions a time to work, unlike an “all or nothing” 
weapon like air power, while providing a constant presence. 
· United States naval vessels are sovereign U.S. territory and therefore are 
not subject to the same political constraints as land-based forces. 
· Utilizing naval forward presence and prepositioning ships near the likely 
theater of operation significantly reduces reaction time and transportation 
expenses should conflict occur. 
Thomas Jefferson laid the foundation for United States Naval Forward Presence 
in 1801, when he dispatched Commodore Edward Preble to the Mediterranean to get 
leaders of the Barbary States to abide by the Treaty of Peace signed in 1787.  Subsequent 
intervention against the Barbary Pirates in support of the principle of “Freedom of the 
Seas” demonstrated the continuing importance of the region to the United States.  United 
States Naval Forward Presence in the Mediterranean was subsequently reduced, because 
Britain’s Royal Navy guaranteed U.S. interests there for the most part.  However, in 
World War II the United States Navy once again returned in force to the Mediterranean 
to contribute to victory in a theater where success was important to the eventual defeat of 
the European Axis.  Cutting the Axis supply lines and forcing Hitler to split his forces 
between the Mediterranean and the Eastern Front enabled Allied forces to attrite Axis 
forces while honing their own capabilities, all of which prepared the way for the 
successful invasions of the Continent in 1943 at Salerno and Normandy in 1944.  
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Supplied with adequate equipment and seasoned soldiers, the Allies finally defeated the 
Nazis in Europe and saved the world from fascism. 
Following World War II, the Truman Doctrine signaled the United States’ 
acceptance of responsibility for defending Europe’s southern flank after Great Britain 
was no longer able to meet its commitments there.  Formation of the Mediterranean Sixth 
Fleet allowed naval forward presence to remain in the region and influence many crisis 
situations throughout the years.  The numerous Arab/Israeli wars and Middle East 
conflicts drew increased attention from American and Soviet naval power stationed in the 
Mediterranean.  Constant posturing tested the nerves of both sides and ensured that 
neither side would take unilateral action in the conflicts.  Nevertheless, heightened 
tensions led President Nixon to put all nuclear forces at DEFCON III after Leonid 
Brezhnev threatened to use unilateral force against Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 
1973.  Without United States naval forces present in the region, it is very likely that Israel 
would not have enjoyed the same success that it did during the war.  United States naval 
forces provided the optimal means to strike at Muamaar Qadhafi’s terrorist training 
camps in 1986.  United States naval forward presence again proved its benefits during the 
Bosnian and Kosovo air campaigns.  Even though the United States Navy did not have as 
many aircraft as the United States Air Force, it still managed to fly a significant portion 
of the actual strike missions.  United States surface naval forces demonstrated their 
flexibility and proved their worth numerous times during both operations with short 
notice TLAM strikes. 
However, there are drawbacks to positioning naval forces in littoral areas.  
Operating within confined waters and close to hostile territory puts American ships at 
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increased risk of attack from anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, mine warfare and 
terrorist attacks like the one against the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen.  Additionally, the 
possibility that a United States ship could be accidentally attacked, like the American 
communication ship Liberty during the 1967 Six Day War, is another risk of operating 
close to hostilities.  The decreasing costs and increased availability of sea skimming 
cruise missiles and advanced sea-based mines increase the danger to American ships in 
littoral seas.  However, the overall message is clear that naval forward presence has been 
an extremely important tool in the successful defense of the Mediterranean littoral.  
Although the CVBG may become more vulnerable to future weapons, it is still a viable 
and powerful composition of weapons platforms that will continue successfully to serve 
an important naval forward presence role in the Mediterranean Sea. 
The political and economic importance of the Mediterranean Region to the United 
States will no doubt increase as the global marketplace expands throughout the world.   
Maintaining stability in the region means that the United States must use its naval 
forward presence to remain engaged with NATO allies and economic partners so that 
they do not overreact to situations and to ensure they know that America is interested in 
their political and economic well being.  Additionally, deterring troublemakers from 
aggression requires American naval vessels to be positioned close enough to react 
quickly and keep situations from becoming crises.  United States Naval Forward 
Presence has been in the Mediterranean Sea for over 200 years in support of political and 
economic policies decided on by America’s leaders and will continue to provide 
sufficient military muscle to backup future American interests. 
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Overcoming geographical difficulties and suppressing the capabilities of countries 
employing anti-access techniques requires the United States Navy to forge ahead with 
new and improved weapons systems.  American naval forces forward deployed to the 
Mediterranean or units transiting enroute to the Persian Gulf must continue to have 
technologically superior weapons that can guarantee their safety.  Utilizing technological 
advances and innovative thinking can discourage rogue nations from believing that they 
have the upper hand and that their aggressive actions will not be met with an appropriate 
response by technologically superior forces.  These advances are essential to enable 
Naval forces to operate safely in the littoral environment, in support of Small-Scale 
Contingencies or conventional operations against a more capable enemy.  United States 
Naval Forward Presence has been and should remain in the Mediterranean Sea to protect 
vital sea-lanes of communication and to ensure that unfettered access is enjoyed by all 








































AAAV  Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center 
ASW  Anti Submarine Warfare 
CEC  Cooperative Engagement Capability 
CIWS  Close In Weapons System 
EU  European Union 
HARM High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile 
LCAC  Landing Craft, Air Cushioned 
MCM  Mine Countermeasures 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
MEU(SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable 
MIO  Maritime Interdiction Operation 
NATO  North Atlantic treaty Organization 
NEO  Non-Combat Evacuation Operation 
NSSN  New Attack Submarine 
OTHT  Over the Horizon Targeting 
PKK  Kurdish Workers Party 
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organization 
RF  Radio Frequency 
SEAD  Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SEAL  Sea, Air and Land 
SLOC  Sea-Lanes of Communication 
SNFM  Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean 
SSC  Small-Scale Contingencies 
TBMD  Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
TRAP  Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and/or Personnel 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UUV  Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
UN  United Nations 
100 
USS  United States Ship 
VLS  Vertical Launch System 
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